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TOWARD

NON-NEUTRAL FIRST PRINCIPLES OF
PRIVATE LAW: DESIGNING SECONDARY LIABILITY
RULES FOR NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES*
Thomas C. Folsom"

We can build, or architect, or code [new
technological uses] to protect values that we
believe are fundamental, or we can build, or
architect, or code [them] to allow those values to
disappear... Code is never found, it is only ever
made, and only ever made by us.'
ABSTRACT

A series of recent cases revisits secondary liability in
intellectual property law, solving some particular problems but
without providing completely specified rules that are predictable
and principled. Prior law already includes several varieties of
secondary liability with a rationale for each. Together, these old
and new sources point the way towards a synthesis, which may

* 0 Thomas C. Folsom 2008, 2009.

** Professor, Regent University School of Law; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center; B.S.,
United States Air Force Academy. I thank the University of Akron for its Fall, 2008 Scholars
Forum on "Secondary Liability for IP Infringement: Theory, Practice and Prediction" and each of
the conveners and participants, and especially Professor Jay Dratler, Jr., the moderator, for their
comments and separate insights on the topic. My Research Assistants this year have been Shannon
Brown, Nathan Hall, Nicholas Lepire, Jonathan McDowell and Andrew Page, and I thank each of
them as well. The errors are mine.
1. LAWRENCE LEsslG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 6 (1999). He, of course, is
talking about "cyberspace." Because architecture can be coded, it is important to be concerned
about the contribution of legal rules, which themselves might be purposely developed to encourage
code designs that support rather than destroy the values a polity might reasonably believe to be
fundamental to the legitimate users of the new machines that access and enable cyberspace. To do
so, the decision-makers will have to make some choices. Those choices will not be neutral, but will
necessarily favor one set of values over another. This Article advocates explicitly specified nonneutral principles that can be neutrally applied.
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allow for a designed solution that is more fully specified, at least
in respect of new technological uses. When all is said, secondary
liability in intellectual property law still turns on two essential
questions: (1) is there someone who is liable for direct
infringement, and if so (2) is it "just" to hold someone else
accountable? Both of these inquiries contain embedded variables,
which are to a surprising degree free and indeterminate with
respect to users of new technologies in "places" created by code.
These places created by code include the metaverse, virtual
worlds, cypherspace, and cyberspace proper (the "code world").
The code world and the new machines that enable it constitute
new technological uses (NTUs) that have great economic and
practical consequence. I propose legal rules purposely chosen to
encourage a designed architecture for NTUs that will prefer
hitchhikers, guides and ordinary users to predators, pirates and
spoilers of the new machines and the code world. I propose both a
short-term solution centered on interim safe harbors and a longerterm project to disintegrate liability-style rules from property-style
rules. The solutions depend upon intentional design of liability
rules (is there someone liable for direct infringement?), and of
limited remedies intentionally fitted to the new technological uses
for which they are designed (is it "just" to hold someone else
accountable?).
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PROLOGUE

While insisting upon a neutral application of the law, it may
be time to abandon the search for neutral principles, at least where
there is no Constitutional dimension involved.2 This entails a
serious search for non-neutral principles of private law which may
be applied in a neutral and predictable manner. This approach is
especially valuable in designing laws that will support a normativearchitecture for cyberspace, for the code world of which
cyberspace is a part, and for the new machines that enable it-for
new technological uses.3 This approach is not defined by any
2. Cf generally, Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959) (considering the approach described in the title of his Article).
3. It is aptly observed that "cyberspace" is really a number of different places. See LESSIG,
supranote 1 at 82-83 (describing a number of "cyberplaces" each providing a different experience).
Granted there are different places, it helps to name them. All of these places are part of an
embodied, switched, and coded network for moving information traffic. See Thomas C. Folsom,
Space Pirates,Hitchhikers, Guides, and the Public Interest: TransformationalTrademark Law in
Cyberspace, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 825, 837 (2008). In this Article, I will refer to: (1) the
"metaverse" as that place within the code world characterized by the consensual association of likeminded persons; (2) "virtual worlds as those places within the metaverse further characterized by a
special purpose to participate, almost as citizens in what is almost a polity subject to what is almost
a social compact or game; (3) "cypherspace" as that place characterized by a need for trusted,
secure and strongly encoded or encrypted identities for funds transfers, private, secure or secret
communications and like activities; (4) the "blogosphere" as that place including the new "press"
(where the press is not limited to a newspaper or other traditional distribution channel or medium,
but is recognized as any recorded or encrypted means of carrying political speech), and (5)
"cyberspace" (or "cyberspace proper") as that place characterized by access, navigation,
information-activity, augmentation and trust. Cyberspace proper is important because it embraces
the internet, the phone system, wi-fi, and (probably) much of modem radio and television. See id.
Together, all these places (and others not yet named) constitute part of a larger whole which I will
refer to as the "code world."
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technology, but by principles derived from the uses which real
people make of it, and the corresponding values they ascribe to it.
Because it is not tied to any particular "technology-du jour" and
does not require judges or other juridical agents to become or
pretend to be electrical engineers, this approach is also open to
purposeful development and it can adapt to solve future conflicts
and problems as they arise.4 Accordingly, this approach will not
become obsolete as the technologies come and go, but should
endure even as technologies change.
I am limiting my topic to the code world in which new
technological uses (NTUs) occur, and primarily to intellectual
property conflicts in the code world. I am further limiting my topic
to the search for principles of private law suitable for rational
imposition of secondary liability. By secondary liability, I mean
instances in which one person who is not otherwise liable may be
held accountable for acts of direct infringement by another. The
desired non-neutral principles would be ones that can be applied
fairly because they would be predictable, practical and clearly
connected to an articulated public policy (which policy would be
purposely designed to coincide with the common good, if any, in

The machines, virtual machines, networks and other parts of the embodied switched network that
enable and access the code world may well be referred to simply as the "new machines." The
importance of the distinctive vocabulary will become apparent, because it is apparent that the users
of the metaverse, for example, have expectations and needs that are not identical to those of the
users of virtual worlds, or of cypherspace, or of cyberspace proper (and the same holds for each of
those places in respect of the others). Because of those different "felt needs" it only makes sense for
the law to adjust its demands, if possible, to the new reality. The manufacturers, distributors, and
networkers (and users) of the new machines likewise should be able to demand of the law that the
law recognize what those machines are designed to do, and where (what place within the code
world) they are designed to operate before blithely extending the law's current notions of direct and
secondary liability to new technological users. This does not require that juridical agents become
electrical engineers (indeed, they positively ought not to try), but only that they begin more
confidently to realize that there are real relationships and recognizable patterns of conduct beneath
all the technological veils, smoke and mirrors. While technology might very well have no given
nature, it remains the case that its users certainly do reveal themselves, and their own natures, by the
use they make of their technologies. See infra section IV.
4. It is perhaps not too early for the law to take notice of "psiberspace" (or psyberspace) as
the human/machine frontier. Problems in psiberspace may well give new meaning to the
"use/nonuse" issue in cyberspace trademark law (where, for example, in the near future someone
talking on a cell phone and who speaks a triggered advertising keyword may receive a text message,
or a new destination on a GPS screen, or a whispered voice through an ear-bud) or to the indexing
issue in copyright (where, for example, in the future someone reading an e-book or other document
on their networked reader and taking notes on the electronic copy for subsequent retrieval might
find their note-taking to be monitored and the conduct to be considered as potentially infringing the
reproduction or derivative works rights of a copyright proprietor).
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the new technological uses). It is time to see what NTUs can teach.
I propose that a law purposely designed for NTUs in the code
world and cyberspace is a law that might serve as a model in the
world of ordinary space.5
This focus on NTUs and the code world is for three reasons.
First, NTUs and the code world are something like the law's
canary and can provide an early warning to the existence of
problems otherwise latent in the law. 6 Second, NTUs and the code
world constitute a modular,7 coded domain that (despite many
formidable complexities) can actually be broken down and
redesigned simply by rewriting the code, if only the law can
simply provide some modest leverage to encourage, channel, or
force a redesigned architecture. 8 Third, and finally, NTUs and the
code world are important because the possibility of spectacular
5. I do not claim that there needs to be a law of"cyberspace" (or a law of horses). Cf Frank
H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207, 208 (1996) (asserting
the law of contracts, property or tort might be all that is necessary to understand legal relations in or
affecting horses, and that copyright, patent or other substantive law might be all that is needed to
understand any "law of cyberspace": "[The] principal conclusion: Develop a sound law of
intellectual property [outside of cyberspace], then apply it to computer networks." (emphasis
added)). I claim only that there should be a law that is suitablefor cyberspace (just as it would be
fair to ask whether existing laws are, or are not any good for persons who want to buy, sell, ride,
use, own or rent horses, or for those who might be kicked by, bitten by, or need to clean up after
them). The difference in emphasis between a law "of' and a law "for" cyberspace and the code
world might be a small one in the beginning, but it is significant and increasingly so as further
implications are drawn from it.
6. Cf id.(I am substituting "canary" for Judge Easterbrook's "horse" and for the moment
thinking not so grandly of canary law, but merely using the analogy of a canary in a mineshaft as an
early warning device, pointing to lurking problems in the law not yet noticed).
7. I claim that the ability to transform the law so that it can channel or encourage "recoding"
or other technologically reasonable steps to change the architecture within the code world can be
"modular" and limited to the code world-that is, any changes to the law can be confined to the
code world (so as not to create any sort of undesirable "feedback" loop that might upset settled law
in the ordinary world where the costs of compliance might be substantially higher than in the code
world). See Folsom, supra note 3 at 868-69 (discussing the related concept of feedback loops in
trademark law, and citing Professors Denicola, Maggs and Schechter).
8. The ability simply to change the code, and thereby to alter the objective reality of the code
world, is a feature remarked upon by Professor Lessig. See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 1, at 12-13
(solving the poisonous flower-that-kills-the-neighbor's-dog hypothetical by a reasonable
technological accommodation: upon request and after a short conversation, the offending party
simply rewrites the code to change the properties of the poisonous flower, and in a Pareto superior
move to boot). Of course, Professor Lessig's parable occurs in a coded world which is regulated or
influenced by a combination of laws, markets, norms and architecture. I claim that if the legal
influencers could be made to coincide with the other factors, then it is more likely that the offending
party might actually "volunteer" to rewrite the code upon request than if the law exonerated the
offending conduct altogether (as it might do if it woodenly applied the law of ordinary space to all
aspects of the code world).
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juridical error is nontrivial and perhaps highly likely. 9 Will the
law, in some sense, "shut down" the value-adding provider of
"free" search engine resources (think of a service like that
presently provided by Google, Inc.) by accidentally imposing what
can only be called hostage-style or phantom secondary liability? 10
Will the law, instead, careen to the opposite extreme and declare,
in effect, that anything goes? Or will the law help an established
user (like Google) 1 to create legal-architectural barriers that will
Google can bear the weight,
impose such burdens that, supposing
12
few or no other competitors can?
The desired principles would be non-neutrally designed in the
sense that they would be purposely chosen as part of an
architecture intended to do some good in the code world and for
the new machines that enable it, explicitly considering the public
interest in robust, accessible, navigable and trustworthy
information-rich places. 13 The desired principles would be
designed to prefer value-added resource providers, surfers,
developers and users to pirates, predators, spoilers and wasters; to
encourage the first set while discouraging the second set. 14
9. See Folsom, supra note 3, at 873-76 (discussing the conditions for systemic juridical error
in cyberspace as an application of the judicial agency problem addressed by Professor Bainbridge
and others in differing contexts).
10. See infra section I.A.2.e.
11. "Google" is a registered trademark of Google, Inc. but is sometimes used, as here, in a
nominative sense to refer to the company itself.
12. See Proposed Settlement Agreement, The Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. 05-CV8136 at §§ 2.1(a), 2.1(b) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2008) (awaiting Court approval) (proposing that Google
shall pay 70% of all revenues earned from defined sources, less a 10% operating cost deduction,
into a rightsholders registry and that Google shall pay a minimum of $45 million into a settlement
fund). While the proposed settlement agreement recites that Google "believes that its conduct was
lawful at all times and in all respects" the settlement itself, if approved, cannot avoid becoming a
factor, at least as evidence of custom in any fair use analysis and possibly as evidence of reasonable
royalty calculations in disputes that might affect other parties (including potential competitors of
Google) in the future.
13. I have previously proposed that cyberspace (or "cyberspace proper") is operationally
characterized by degrees of access, navigation, information-activity, augmentation and trust, which
constitute a recognizable public interest. Thomas C. Folsom, Defining Cyberspace (FindingReal
Virtue in the Place of Virtual Reality), 9 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 75, 87-92 (2007). The
Court has already held that the public interest is a factor that must be weighed by a court in deciding
whether to issue injunctive relief after an intellectual property right has been infringed. See eBay,
Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (including the public interest as one of the
equitable factors and holding, in a patent case: "The decision to grant or deny permanent injunctive
relief is an act of equitable discretion by the district court, reviewable on appeal for abuse of
discretion.").
14. My claim is a modest one, and my method is first to identify an actionable offense in the
code world and then to define the "pirate" as one who engages in the offensive conduct. Those
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These principles are not neutral between pirates and their
victims; these principles candidly take sides, and in that sense,
they are non-neutral. However, these principles are capable of
neutral application because such terms as "pirate" or predator,
waster and spoiler would be defined in rule-specific form, rather
than hurled about as conclusions in search of an argument. 15 The
principles are suitable for neutral assessment by actors and their
legal advisors ex ante, for neutral application and adjudication in a
court of law based on facts that can be determined ex post, and are
amenable to neutral appellate review. In this most important and
fundamental sense they are, indeed, neutral.

steps avoid the equivocation that otherwise inheres in the term. I am aware that "pirate" might
signify at least: (1) a romantic high achiever who breaks a few "technical" rules in pursuit of noble
ends, or whose "good" deeds outweigh the bad; a term of endearment or admiration (a
"swashbuckler" or "Robin Hood"); or (2) an epithet in search of an argument; name-calling; a
question-begging trick by which a judge magically confers liability on a party by attaching a label
on conduct, the legality of which was thought to be the question to be decided; a way to impose
liability upon a person who "reaps where he or she did not sow" under the now-discredited "sweat
of the brow" theory of intellectual property rights; or (3) a calculating, deliberate lawbreaker or
deceiver who injures others and causes harm. See Folsom, supra note 3, at note 225 (identifying a
case of name-calling), id. at note 226 (identifying cases of begrudging or outright admiration).
The third sense of the word "pirate" illustrates the method I propose: after first specifying an
offense in the code world, then "pirate" becomes a meaningful term. See id. (identifying an
actionable offense involving calculated deception in an objective cyberspace which relies upon a
virtual map characterized by markers, addresses and magnets, and defining a pirate as one who
alters the map, tampers with addresses or magnets, plants deceptive addresses or magnets, or blocks
or spoils addresses otherwise available, thereby denying access, obstructing navigation, diverting
information traffic, taking advantage of augmented presences, and destroying trust in cyberspace).
Similarly specific offenses and corresponding definitions of piracy might be proposed in other
places and in other contexts within the code world. In each case, the "pirate" would be defined in
relation to an identified offense.
I do not claim that deliberately trying to specify and target pirates in the code world will
prove to be an unfailing guide to the development of a law for cyberspace and the code world, but
only that it will provide a much better, and a more rational guide than accidentally flailing around in
cyberspace as if the law were "evolving" and were both utterly neutral and utterly clueless, or as if
some answer lurks in the technology itself. Where a limited remedy, confined to the code world,
and resting on reasonable technological accommodations is not only possible but also likely to lead
to a normative redesign of the architecture, or code, it seems oddly perverse not to transform the law
in a way that might make it more suitable for cyberspace. The law can ill afford to be not only
unhelpful but also comically inapt, and I claim only that at least identifying the right normative
questions is better than not. See Part IV infra (applying the Jabberwock and other figures from
Lewis Carroll).
15. Folsom supra note 3,passim & id. at 887-90, 917 (defining a "pirate" in cyberspace, after
having first specified an actionable offense).
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INTRODUCTION

After the Prologue, this Article is in four parts. Part I
describes the current secondary liability rules, as modified by
recent cases. Part II describes a number of paired relations of
recurring instances of direct/secondary actors. Part III proposes a
design for secondary liability for new technological uses. Part IV
is the epilogue.
I. DESCRIBING SECONDARY LIABILITY RULES
A. Secondary Liability in Copyright and Trademark (and
elsewhere)
This Article is published as part of a Symposium issue
dedicated to papers presented at a forum convened to discuss some
four or five recent cases and the general status of secondary
liability in intellectual property law.' As a result, I am assuming
an audience with some familiarity with the issues and the cases. I
will summarize only so much of the basic framework as is
necessary to advance my argument, and I will begin with what
must be a fairly basic and unremarkable summary of existing
rules. The reader will appreciate that I have limited my focus to
copyright (and trademark) secondary liability rules because the
issues they confront are relatively congruent even if the current
rules are not, and because they most nearly address the particular
issues of new machines and new technological uses in the code
world that I believe are especially suitable for a designed solution.
I will refer to the patent law only as necessary to set up the
copyright and trademark cases.
The following is a list that presents, with a few exceptions
which I will note, what I believe can be fairly described as the
conventional rules and categories of secondary liability in
copyright and trademark.

16. Among the recent copyright-related cases discussed at the forum and also addressed in
this paper are Metro-Goidwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005); Perfect
10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n, 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007); and Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576
F. Supp. 2d 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). The patent-related cases that were discussed in the forum do not
so prominently affect my analysis, which is limited to issues of secondary liability for copyright
(and trademark) offenses in cyberspace and the cede world.
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1. The Most General Statement of the Rule
Secondary liability in intellectual property and elsewhere in
the law might seem chaotic, or at least challenging. Even the
choice of words used to describe the genus, species and strands of
the various related doctrines is not entirely free from doubt.
Sometimes, "secondary" liability refers to the genus, while
"vicarious" and "contributory" refer to two of the species of
secondary liability. This usage is by no means universal. 17 Before
stating the most general version of the rule, some preliminary
remarks about terminology will be helpful.
For purposes of this Article "secondary liability" signifies the
condition in which an actor has the power to create liability in
another person, in the absence of any basis otherwise for finding
direct liability on the part of the other. The result of secondary
liability, and its defining characteristic, is that the other becomes
liable for the actor's misdeeds. Secondary liability for
infringement of intellectual property signifies the application of
the doctrine to intellectual property. In this context, it signifies the
conditions in which an actor has the power to create liability for
copyright, patent, or trademark (or cognate intellectual property)
infringement in another, in the absence of direct liability on the
part of the other.
The most general statement of the rule of secondary liability
depends upon the answer to a straightforward question that
identifies the broader problem. The broader problem was simply
stated by the Supreme Court (apparently using the term "vicarious

17. Settling upon the proper labels is no satisfactory task. In intellectual property, it seems
common to use "secondary" or "indirect" liability as the genus, with "vicarious" liability
constituting one of the species. Outside of intellectual property it seems rather common to use
"vicarious" liability as the genus. If I were writing on a blank slate, I might have preferred to
nominate a clean term, without baggage, to serve as the generic term-perhaps a term such as
"substitutionary" liability would permit me to use "substitute liability" as the genus, better to
encompass all of the concepts at which the cases are instinctively striving.
Likewise, there might be good reason to stay away from the term "secondary" liability
altogether because of its misleading connotations (in contractually based surety or guarantee
contexts, the party with "secondary" liability actually has agreed to answer for the same debt that
the other (the principal, or the party "primarily" liable) has already agreed to answer for, but
between the two of them and the creditor, and between the two of them inter se, there are various
rights and defenses. But, all things considered, no real harm is done in following what appear to be
the reigning conventions. So "secondary" liability will be the generic term in this Article unless the
context otherwise indicates.
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liability" as a generic term for secondary liability outside of
intellectual property):
The absence of such express language [in the
Copyright Act] as that contained in the Patent Act
[establishing liability on a person who "actively
induces" infringement or who is a "contributory"
infringer] does not preclude the imposition of
liability for copyright infringements on certain
parties who have not themselves engaged in the
infringing activity. For vicarious liability is
imposed in virtually all areas of the law and the
concept of contributory infringement is merely a
species of the broader problem of identifying the
circumstances in which it is [1] just to hold one
individual
18 [2] accountable for the actions of
another.
That statement of the broader problem determines the form
that any corresponding answer must take. With the Court's
statement of the problem as a starting point, secondary liability in
copyright law (or any other law) must, at the most basic level,
stand for a general proposition that can be readily stated:
The general rule of secondary liability. One is liable for the
infringement (or other impermissible act) of an actor only where
(1) the offending conduct of the actor constitutes actionable
infringement, and (2) there are circumstances in which it is "just"
to hold the other accountable for the conduct of the actor. 19
This may be called the general rule, or the "two part" rule of
secondary liability. Part one-is someone directly liable, for

18. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 434-36 (1984)
(emphasis added). The Court immediately turned to Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911)
to give an example where such circumstances were "plainly" present, quoting Mr. Justice Holmes:
"The defendant not only expected but invoked by advertisement the use of its films for dramatic
reproductions of the [copyrighted] story. That was the most conspicuous purpose for which they
could be used, and the one for which especially they were made. If the defendant did not contribute
to the infringement it is impossible to do so except by taking part in the final act. It is liable on
principles recognized in every part of the law." Kalem Co., 222 U.S. at 62-63 (holding the
defendant, a film producer, secondarily liable for infringement of the public performance rights
attendant upon showing of the film by various exhibitors to whom the producer had sold copies of
the film).
19. Id.This seems to follow directly from the Court's statement of the issue.
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something? Part two--if so, is there someone
else of whom it can
20
accountable?
them
hold
to
just
is
it
be said
After stating the general rule of secondary liability, the Court
noted various other labels had been applied in cases involving "an
ongoing relationship" between the direct infringer and the
contributory infringer, including cases in which the "contributory"
infringer "was in a position to control the use of copyrighted
works by others and had [itself] authorized the use without
permission of the copyright owner.",2 1 The Court went on to
unpack at least two subcategories of secondary liability. One
might be secondarily liable by contributing to another's
infringement with knowledge of it ("contributory"), or by taking a
direct financial benefit in another's infringement while being able
to control it ("vicarious").22 The Court also referred to a kind of
attenuated
direct liability, by "authorizing" the offending
23
conduct.

The more particular content of secondary liability and the
various labels for particularizing the general rule of it will be
discussed later in this Article.24 A suitable taxonomy that contains
all those particular subcategories and some additional ones to be
discussed in Section I.A.2 of this Article divides them into (1)
20. Id. There must be some direct liability by someone, and there must be someone else to
hold accountable, on some basis that is "just."
21. Sony, 464 U.S. at 436. (continuing its analysis of Kalem, and noting the subsequent dance
hall cases in which there was secondary liability, the landlord tenant cases in which there was not,
and suggesting some sort of ongoing relationship combined with some sort of ability to control as a
common thread in some situations labeled "vicarious" liability and in other situations labeled
"contributory" liability).
The Court identified at least two subcategories of secondary liability: (i) "vicarious," see
id. at note 18 (citing Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963) as a
case of vicarious liability in the context of a relationship); and (2) "contributory," see id (citing
Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1971) as a case of
contributory liability in the context of an ability to police the infringing conduct, coupled with
actual knowledge that infringement was occurring and substantial benefit from the infringement). It
should be noted the Court also observed that "authorization" of certain infringing acts is itself a
[direct] violation of the Copyright Act. Id. at 435, note 17 (pointing to the first sentence of§ 106).
The Court observed that Sony involved allegations of an "unprecedented contributory
infringement claim" but that the parties had announced that neither "direct infringement"
(presumably by "authorization") nor "vicarious infringement" (presumably by ability to control,
plus a direct financial benefit received) by Sony were nominally before the Court. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. The generalized rule is simply: (1) direct liability by someone, and (2) circumstances in
which it is "just" to hold someone else accountable. The particular rules for contributory, vicarious,
and other subcategories will be discussed infra in Section I.A.2.
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fault-based (contributory and inducement-style), (2) relationshipbased (the various vicarious or respondeat superior-styles), and
(3) consent-based (surety-style) secondary liability. Perhaps those
categories exhaust the circumstances in which it is "just" to hold
one person accountable for the conduct of another, or perhaps
there are two other categories to consider: perhaps there is some
sort of (4) amorphous policy-based type, and perhaps there is even
some sort of (5) imperfectly articulated hostage-style of secondary
liability.
Prior to considering the particular subcategories, it is well to
reflect that many of the more perplexing cases of secondary
liability arise in situations where new technological uses implicate
copyright and trademark law. At the level of the general rule, these
NTU cases are especially complicated by the fact that, in many of
them, each of the two parts of the general rule is in doubt or
dispute.25 These might be called compound cases, because there
are two problems simultaneously in play. The compound cases
tend to hide fundamental problems of indeterminacy in the
substantive law within the argument about, and concerns over
whether it is just to hold someone else responsible for the conduct
in question. It is not always clear that the conduct of the direct
offender is, either as a matter of fact or of law, 26 impermissible.
25. One of the (many) extraordinary circumstances of the Sony case is that the first element
(was there any direct infiingement at all?) was every bit as controversial as the second element.
That is, it appears it may have been hotly disputed whether the unauthorized copying of the entirety
of a single copyrighted item, for "noncommercial" and "home" use even was copyright
infringement. See Jessica Litman, The Story of Sony v. UniversalStudios: Mary Poppins Meets the
Boston Strangler, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 358, 368 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle
Cooper Dreyfuss, eds. 2006) (noting that Justice Stevens, for one, read the copyright statute as "not
prohibit[ing] consumers from making single copies of copyrighted works for their own private use"
at least in the context of the case); see also id at 382-83 (noting that the popular press widely
reported Sony as "holding that consumers do not violate the law when they tape television
programs" transmitted over the air and that "the case came immediately to stand for the proposition
that private noncommercial copying was fair use").
26. One of the elusive aspects of Sony is the difficulty (to put it mildly) of matching the facts
to the holding (or to the popular understanding of the holding, see supra note 25)-if the "facts"
really were that "no one" was keeping a "library" of the time-shifted content, but that "everyone"
was simply recording, watching (once, as was the "deal" expected by those broadcasters who
broadcasted the free content, one time), and erasing the content, then the case does not stand for the
holding that "all [private, noncommercial home] copying is permissible and free." If, in fact, it is
clear that the "facts" were actually a legal fiction-if indeed it is (with a legal wink and a nod)
known that "everyone" was in fact "librarying" the shows (what else would they be doing?.), and the
Court and everyone reading the opinion and living in the same world simply knew that the Court
"had" to say otherwise, then the holding might very well be that "all copying is permissible and free
[at least if the copier is not massively redistributing the material by selling or giving it away to
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This leads to an as-yet imperfectly acknowledged feedback loop.
One might be reluctant, on the one hand, to decide an open issue
of substantive law in a way that might be expected to lead to
increased direct liability for fear of imposing a vast scope of
potential secondary liability; 27 and one might be reluctant, on the
other hand, to constrain secondary28 liability for fear of opening the
floodgates of direct infringement.
2. The Particular Subcategories of Secondary Liability
Within the genus of so-called "secondary liability" are three
(or four) standard subcategories, and a fifth that I believe must be
named. It would seem that each of these five constitutes a
separate, more or less rule-specific, attempt to answer the
question: when, exactly, is it "just" to hold one person to account
for the unlawful conduct of another. The first four categories are:
(1) fault-style (contributory and inducement types), (2)
others]." If verbatim copying of the entirety of a copyrighted work is permissible and free, then it
follows that there is no direct liability, and so there can be no secondary liability. See generally
Litman, supranote 25.
27. Perhaps surprisingly, it is not entirely clear that making a verbatim copy (or a perfect
analog or digital copy) of a copyrighted work for a superseding or substitutionary use is always an
instance of unconsented, unprivileged direct infringement. See supra note 25. It would seem that
any determination of secondary liability would need to presuppose such a finding (or else a finding
that "most" or "much" or "a lot" of such copying is illegal). Apart from the specter of secondary
liability (on libraries and any other facility that makes photocopiers available, on intemet service
providers and others who make digital pipelines and storage facilities available, and so on) it might
have been imagined that the question: "does copyright (at least) prevent verbatim copying for
superseding or substitutionary uses of the copyrighted work of authorship?" might have been
considered both trivial and obvious, if not somewhat ridiculous. Of course, one might very well
wish, and it would not be ridiculous to argue, on policy or other grounds, for a copyright-free zone,
but it seems rather hard to grant the actual existence of a real copyright law without accepting that
the direct and immediate consequence of doing so is to rule out verbatim substitutional copying of
the entirety of a work, absent very compelling circumstances. Any feedback loop that puts pressure
on a juridicial actor to befog, or to avoid answering this fundamental question of direct liability, or
to dance around it, because of its direct connection to the prospect of the linked secondary liability,
and the unwanted result of "banning" the VCR or the photocopier (or of dealing with the tricky
problems of designing some sort of royalty pool and then factoring that into the price of the product,
or of creating some special statutory exception or "safe harbor") should be explicitly acknowledged.
Perhaps it would be better if secondary liability rules could be designed to break the feedback loop.
See infra section IV (suggesting such an approach).
28. If, in fact, there is a scoff-law society that will obey copyright law only if it is "hard" to
copy, or if it is "easy" to be caught (so that on a cost-benefit, or "choice" theory of law, one will
obey any law only if it pays to do so), then the simple fact is that if the law does not hold a major
player secondarily liable then no one will be deterred, and "everyone" will simply infringe to their
heart's content. In that case there will be a reluctance to hold secondary liability rules in check, and
a correspondingly greater pressure to expand the reach of secondary liability.
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relationship-style (the various vicarious or respondeat superior
types), (3) consent-style (the suretyship type), and (4) a policystyle of secondary liability (a category that must be reserved for a
set of cases not readily cabined in any other grouping). Then, for
purposes of argument and as a limiting or boundary case, I add a
fifth possibility: a "hostage-style" of secondary liability.
a. Fault-Style Subcategories (contributory and
inducement types)
There are two fault-style subcategories. These two,
contributory-style and inducement-style secondary liability, will
be discussed in this section. I consider them to be fault-based
because each depends upon actual knowledge (or at least, notice or
reason to know) 9 of the offending conduct coupled with positive
action.
Contributory-Style. One who [1] with knowledge of the
infringing activity by an actor, [2] materially contributes to it will
be secondarily liable for infrin§ement by the actor.3 0 This is a rule
common to many fields of law 1 and one that is applicable in each
of the three major intellectual property disciplines. It is explicitly

29. See Laura A. Heymann, Knowing How to Know: Secondary Liability for Speech,
(forthcoming 2009) (asking: "once allegedly unlawful material is brought to an intermediary's
attention, when does knowledge occur?").
30. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005)
(announcing the rule that "[o]ne infringes contributorily by [1] intentionally, [2] inducing or
encouraging direct infringement." For "'encouraging' direct infringement", I have substituted the
expression "materially contributes to it" because I believe it to be a somewhat more traditional
usage in other fields of law, and there is no reason to suppose the Court meant to add anything new
to the formulation). See id. (acknowledging the doctrines it just enunciated have "emerged from
common law principles and are well established in the law.") In my formulation of the rule for
contributory-style secondary liability, I have omitted the expression "inducing" because I believe
Grokster clearly signals that "inducement" liability is a category distinct from "contributory."
Finally, although I use the expression, "materially contributes to it," rather than "causes" the
infringement, it should be understood that my expression includes a notion of causation and invites
a policy-based limitation on contributory-style secondary liability as well as a fact-based inquiry.
See Jay Dratler, Jr., Palsgraf Principlesof Tort Law, and the PersistentNeed for Common-Law
Judgment in IP Infringement Cases, 3 AKRON INTEL. PROP. J. 21, 25-37 (2009) (recalling the need
to find proximate cause and culpability, as limitations on the "duty" to respect intellectual property
rights).
31. See infra section I.A.2.a. (summarizing criminal law and tort law fonts of contributory and
inducement secondary liability), section I.A.2.b. (summarizing agency and tort fonts of various
vicarious/respondeat superior versions), and see section I.A.2.c (summarizing consensual fonts of
secondary liability).
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embraced within the Patent Act, 32 and has been applied as a
common law doctrine in copyright 33 and trademark cases.3 4
The Patent Act not only explicitly provides for contributory
liability, but also establishes a protection for those who deal in
staple articles of commerce having a substantial non-infringing
use. 3 5 In copyright law as well, the doctrine of contributory
liability is qualified by a doctrine of "substantial non-infringing
use" borrowed from patent law 36 and which bars secondary
liability in another for direct infringement by an actor who is
making an infringing use. 37 One might presume the same must be
true in trademark cases, if there were occasion to speak of a
substantial non-infringing use (by some actors) of an expression
that may be used by other actors to cause a likelihood of
confusion, and if there were another person who otherwise 38has
"contributed" to the direct infringement by the offending actor.

32. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2006) (and establishing a defense to contributory liability if the
offending product is a "staple item of commerce" having a "substantial non-infringing use").
33. See supra note 18 (discussing Sony and Kalem, both of which embrace "contributory"
liability as a subcategory of secondary liability in copyright cases).
34. See infra note 49 (discussing Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 853-54
(1982) which invokes a contributory-style of secondary liability in trademark cases), but cf., Sony,
464 U.S. at 439, footnote 19 (warning that Inwood's standard for contributory-style secondary
liability in trademark cases is more "narrow" than the rule employed for contributory-style
secondary liability in copyright cases, on a reading of Inwood that requires the party secondarily
liable to have "[actual] knowledge" of "[specifically] identified individuals known by it to be
engaging in continuing infringement...").
35. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2006).
36. Sony, 464 U.S. at 440-42.
37. Id.
38. It does, in fact, make sense to conceptualize the trademark problem in such a light. One
might suppose that a fair, descriptive or nominative use of a trademarked expression might be
treated as an example of a "substantial non-infringing use" of expressions made available by an
internet resource provider to others as domain names, search terms, or triggered advertising
keywords. One might also suppose that staple or legitimate articles of commerce might as easily be
resold fairly at retail by wholesale purchasers at least as readily as those same articles might be
misbranded, mis-marked, repackaged and stamped with counterfeit trademarks by the wholesale
purchaser in preparation for infringing resale. See generally, Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc.,
456 U.S. 844, 854 and note 13 (1982) (discussing inducement-style or contributory-style liability
and rejecting the notion that the manufacturer of generic drugs ought to be secondarily liable merely
because they "could reasonably anticipate" illegal resale of the generic drug in capsules misbranded
by some pharmacists with the mark of the mark proprietor, and holding the manufacturers without
knowledge of trademark infringement and thus not secondarily liable). The generic drug is itself
obviously non-infringing, and the noted language in Inwood certainly seems instinct with a
"substantial non-infiinging use" rationale, though it has not yet been interpreted as such. Cf
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 27, cmt. (c) and illustration 2 (1995) (basing
secondary liability upon "reason to know" of the primary infringement), and id., cmt. (d) and
illustration 3 (basing secondary liability upon sales to known infringers).
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One might suppose the normative rationale for the bar against
secondary liability in cases that would otherwise amount to
contributory infringement would be the same among each of
copyright, patent and trademark, and is either (1) that in the
absence of actual direct knowledge of particular infringement by
an identified actor, the existence of substantial non-infringing use
must conclusively refute any attribution to the provider of any sort
of imputed or constructive knowledge (or notice) of infringement
on the part of a user or consumer of the goods or services
provided; or else (2) that it is intended to be an absolute privilege
even in the face of actual knowledge that infringement is
occurring. 39 Perhaps the normative reason for the bar is, instead of
or in addition to the two reasons just given, simply an expression
of a policy in favor of the public interest in having easy access to
goods or services even if such goods or services might make for
easier, cheaper and better (more efficient) infringing downstream
uses by some actors and even if such infringement is well-known,
open, obvious and notorious.
Indeed, because contributory liability might be applied in so
expansive a manner as to be intolerable, 40 the bar of substantial
non-infringing use must be just one of many limitations upon the
otherwise unchecked potential for expansion of contributory
liability. Such limitations are not unheard of in other areas of the
law. Because the Court has explicitly acknowledged that
contributory liability is well grounded, and well known in
generally applicable principles of law, it would seem evident that
the hunch there may be any number of limitations on the doctrine
as applied to copyright and trademark cases should be tested by
reference to limitations upon that doctrine outside of intellectual
39. This could, perhaps, have been signaled by one of the concurring opinions in the Court's
Grokster case. See infra, section I.B. 1.
40. The general law of secondary liability outside of intellectual property seems characterized
by care to avoid unchecked secondary liability, probably because it would be intolerable generally
to hold one person liable for the offending conduct of another. See infra, notes 41-46 (discussing
some limitations on secondary liability in the general law analogous to contributory liability and
inducement style liability in intellectual property); infra section l.A.2(b) (discussing analogous
limitations on agency-style liability); infra section I.A.2(c) (discussing analogous limitations on
surety-style liability). The manner in which the doctrine of contributory liability has been
formulated in intellectual property perhaps contributes to the confusion over it; when importing
rules for secondary liability in intellectual property, the Court has frequently alluded to the existence
of some "general law" of secondary liability, but has much less frequently articulated any definite
content. See supra note 18 (quoting Justice Holmes' simple appeal to "principles recognized in
every part of the law.")
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property. The truth of this hunch is amply demonstrated, and a
brief survey reveals it to be so.
In criminal law, for example, other limitations upon more or
less analogous fault-based contributory-style secondary liability
include nice distinctions among principals in the first degree and
second degree, accessories before the fact and after the fact, and
corresponding technical rules of procedure that tend to shield
against secondary liability.4 1 The closely related criminal law
doctrine of fault-based contributory-style liability under the rubric
of accomplice liability is accompanied by limitations on its
reach. 42 Instances of post-crime
aid, misprision and compounding
43
are similarly circumscribed.
In tort law, other limitations upon analogous fault-based
secondary liability include the notion that secondary liability for
one "who knowingly provides aid or encouragement to another's
commission of a tort" is limited to aid or encouragement that must
be "substantial."" Moreover, it seems safe to say that liability for
"concerted action" in tort requires a common design or purpose to
offend, with mutual aid to carry it out, accompanied by yet further
limitations on the doctrine. Likewise, tort law limits secondary
liability for non-actors in "conspiracies" to situations
in which the
' 6
non-acting conspirators "have promoted the act. A
41. See generally, WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW (4th ed. 2003), § 13.1 (discussing
principals in first and second degree, accessories before the fact, and procedural problems).
42. Id. (discussing elements and limitations relating to principles in the first and second
degree, accessories before the fact, and procedural problems); Id. at §§ 13.2, 13.3 (discussing
elements of accomplice liability and its limitations).
43. Id. at § 13.6 (discussing post-crime aid, accessory after the fact, misprision and
compounding).
44. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS §340 at 937 and n. 36 (2000); accord,RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) TORTS § 876(b) (1979). It would seem that to provide "aid" would be a form of
contributory-style secondary liability (and to provide "encouragement" would seem to be a form of
inducement-style secondary liability).
45. W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON, DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER AND
KEETON ON TORTS § 46 at 322-24 (5th ed. 1984). Some limitations on "acting in concert" include
the recognition that "mere knowledge by each party of what the other is doing" is a "clearly wrong"
statement of the rule and is not enough to serve as a basis for holding each party to be liable since
"there is ordinarily no duty to take affirmative steps to interfere"; "mere presence at the commission
of the wrong, or failure to object to it, is not enough to charge one with responsibility"; and one
"who innocently and carefully, does an act which happens to further the tortious purpose of
another" is not acting in concert. Id. It would seem that to act in concert would be a form of
contributory-style secondary liability.
46. Id. Perhaps conspiracy is a form of direct liability, but it shades into contributory fault.
There is some analog between the liability of a non-acting conspirator and the contributory liability
of anyone who with knowledge, materially contributes to an offense. The significance is the
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It would seem clear that, to the extent the doctrine of faultbased contributory liability has been imported into copyright and
trademark from the Patent Act, all of the "substantial noninfringing use" doctrine of the Patent Act should, to the extent
relevant, come along as well. At least as important, it should also
be the case that, to the extent the doctrine of fault-based
contributory liability has been imported into copyright and
trademark (and even into the patent statute) from general common
law antecedents, all of the relevant general common law
limitations may, and probably should also be, imported. A bar
against contributory liability because the items or services
contributed are capable of substantial non-infringing use is a
sensible limitation on the doctrine of contributory liability for
intellectual property cases, but it is by no means the only
limitation on the doctrine.
Inducement-Style. One who [1] with knowledge of the
infringing activity, [2] intentionally induces, or actively
of an actor will be secondarily
encourages, the infringing conduct 47
liable for infringement by the actor.
This is a rule that is applicable to each of the three major
intellectual property disciplines. It is part of the Patent Act.48 It has

limitation upon the tort liability of the non-acting conspirator, and the degree of knowledge
necessary to make the liability stick.
47. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005)
(announcing the rule that "[o]ne infringes contributorily by [1] intentionally, [2] inducing or
encouraging direct infringement."). In my formulation of the rule for inducement-style secondary
liability, I have omitted the expression "contributorily" because I believe Grokster clearly signals
that "inducement" liability is a category distinct from "contributory"-style secondary liability, and I
have added the qualifier "actively encourages" to distinguish the objectionable conduct present in
cases of active encouragement that resulted in inducement-style secondary liability (such as
Grokster and Kalem) from the cases in which there is, or appears to be, less active encouragement
and that resulted in the absence of inducement-style secondary liability (in cases such as Sony). The
qualifier "actively induces" is also part of the analogous statutory provision relating to inducementstyle liability under section 271(b) of the Patent Act, and is part of the analogous common law
formulation relating to inducement-style liability in trademark law as summarized in section 27(a)
of the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition. Though it is perhaps redundant, because to
intentionally induce must presuppose knowledge of the infringing activity, I have retained the
element of "knowledge" to make it clear that both contributory-style and inducement-style
secondary liability require knowledge, and that each is therefore fault-based. This contrasts both of
them with the various styles of "vicarious" liability in intellectual property law.
48. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2006) ("Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be
liable as an infringer").
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been announced as a rule in trademark law,4 9 and it has been
applied in copyright cases.50
One might guess there is no room for raising a "substantial
non-infringing use" defense in any case of proven inducementstyle secondary liability. That defense does not logically extend
beyond the contributory-style cases. It has appeared in other types
of cases, but perhaps only because the plaintiff has pled multiple
grounds for secondary liability, the defendant is answering the
specific allegations of contributory-style secondary liability, and
the court is attempting to be comprehensive in its analysis. Surely,
where the defendant is alleged to have actually induced the
specific offending conduct of an actor with knowledge that it is
doing so, any defense that the items or services provided might
have been innocently directed to, or innocently used by the actor
or someone else must be irrelevant. In cases of fault-based
inducement-style liability, it should be supposed that inducement
will be established only by substantial proof and only in li ht of a
burden of proof and persuasion borne by the plaintiff.5 If, as

49. RESTATEMENT, supra note 38, §27(a) (a secondary actor is liable for trademark
infringement if the actor "actively induces" another person to engage in the infringing conduct);
Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 853-54 (1982) (noting, in a case involving a
manufacturer of a generic drug that had been purchased by some pharmacists who resold it
encapsulated in the colors of, and bearing the brand of a senior trademark user, that "liability for
trademark infringement can extend beyond those who actually mislabel goods with the mark of
another" and that a manufacturer of a product incorporated into a mislabeled item sold by another
might be held responsible "[elven if it does not directly control others in the chain of distribution.")
The rule announced was this: "if a manufacturer or distributor [1] intentionally induces another to
infringe a trademark, or [2] if it continues to supply its product to one whom it knows or has reason
to know is engaging in trademark infringement, the manufacturer is contributoily responsible for
any harm done as a result of the deceit." Id. Finding that the manufacturers had not, in fact, induced
the pharmacists to mislabel the drugs, and that they had not, in fact, continued to supply pharmacists
whom they knew to be mislabeling the drugs, the Court held the manufacturers not secondarily
liable. Id at 855-58.
It may be seen that Inwood announced two rules for secondary liability in trademark
cases. One is "inducement"-style for intentional inducement, and the other is (perhaps) a kind of
"contributory"-style for materially contributing to the infringement, by continuing to supply the
product with knowledge (if it knows or should have known) of trademark infringement. Id. See
also RESTATEMENT, supra note 38, §27(b) (announcing a rule of secondary liability if the actor
"fails to take reasonable precautions against" another person's infringing conduct in circumstances
in which the infringing conduct "can be reasonably anticipated.") But see supra note 34 for a more
narrow reading of Inwood (the Court, in Sony, seemingly read Inwood as requiring actual
knowledge of infringement by specifically identified actors).
50. E.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
51. Many of the limitations set in tort law, see supra section I.A.l.a (discussing
"contributory" liability) and some of the limitations set in criminal law, id, should become part of
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seems to be the case, the "substantial non-infringing use" defense

provides either (1) some strong presumption against attribution of
knowledge to the secondarily liable party, or even (2) some
absolute privilege against secondary liability when someone
knows that some infringing uses are occurring, 52 then it must be
that the defense (on either basis) cannot apply when the person
secondarily liable goes so far as to "act in concert with" 53 an actor
or otherwise actually induces the direct infringement.
Likewise, one might well assume there is little room,
relevance or applicability for many of the other general law
limitations on fault-based secondary liability when it comes to the
inducement-style subcategory. 54 Assuming, as seems safe to do,
that inducement-style is a "narrow" version of fault-based
secondary liability, applying only in the most egregious cases, and
assuming also that any prevailing plaintiff will have necessarily
made a formidable evidentiary showing, 55 this would seem the
paradigmatic type of fault on the part of the secondarily liable
party that is most clearly a situation in which it is "just" to hold
another person liable for the infringement of an actor.
b. Relationship-Style Subcategories (vicarious and
expanded-for-copyright vicarious types) of Secondary
Liability
There are two relationship-style subcategories. These two, the
vicarious-style (respondeat superior) and the expanded-forcopyright vicarious-style (the special doctrine purposely designed
the analysis. That is to say, "inducement" of the offending conduct should always require at least
the degree of involvement necessary to establish "contribution" to it, and then some.
52. I suggested these two rationales, supratext accompanying note 39.
53. The "act in concert with" gloss is derived from some versions of the cognate tort law
doctrines applicable to fault-based secondary liability. See supranote 45.
54. To be sure, it is necessary to prove "inducement" but it would seem that all the limitations
on contributory-style would necessarily either be met or would be inapplicable (that is, any proven
inducement would necessarily be a "substantial" act, would not be an "innocent" act, would
constitute more than "mere knowledge" followed by failure to prevent, and so on). See generally,
supra note 45 for discussion of those limitations.
55. I am assuming, that is, that "inducement" is not a synonym for "contributory." Because
the concepts are related (each is a form of fault-based secondary liability) but quite different, this
would seem a very safe assumption to make. The fact that the two different words are often used
together in the same phrase to describe secondary liability, as by, "contributing to or inducing" the
infringing act of another, and the fact that the standards of each have tended to be conflated is best
explained by the accident that reported cases of inducement-style may be somewhat rare, and the
language that reflexively combines contributory with inducement has probably become habitual.
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for copyright cases), will be discussed in this section. It is
interesting to contrast these relationship-based styles of secondary
liability rules with the fault-based rules just discussed. The faultbased rules (contributory and inducement) each require that the
non-acting party at least have knowledge of the infringing activity.
With such knowledge, the secondarily liable non-actor either
materially contributes to, or actively induces the actor's
infringement (and does so outside of the defenses and limitations
that might shield the non-actor). It is this knowledge coupled with
wrongful action of some sort that justifies my use of the label
"fault-based" to describe them.
In contrast, the various respondeat superior or vicariousstyles of secondary liability are based on the agency relationship,
or in the expanded-for-copyright version, on something like the
rationale for imposing it in a true agency relationship. This aspect
justifies my use of the label "relationship-style" (or status-style) to
describe them. Although every person who is secondarily liable
necessarily has some relationship, in some sense of the word, with
the direct infringer, it is the heightened, agency-derived
relationship, which must describe the rational provenance of this
latter type of secondary liability. The notion is that the one who
employs a servant-type agent must, somehow and at least in some
circumstances, be justly held accountable for the actions of the
of the relationship and regardless of the
servant, simply because
56
employer's fault.
Vicarious-Style. In an agency relationship further
characterized as a master-servant relationship, [1] a master [2] will
be liable for torts causing personal injury committed by her
as a matter
servant [3] acting within the scope of his employment,
5
of vicarious liability or respondeatsuperior.
This is a familiar rule of agency law and, though subject to
some dispute over its precise wording, 5 8 it seems more or less
56. See, DOBBS, supra note 44 at 907-10 (summarizing various explanations, including the
idea that such liability is "fair and just" because, although the enterprise relationship followed by
expected harm in the course of repeated activity and typical or characteristic of the enterprise is "not
moral fault" (emphasis added), it is nonetheless the case that the employer should accept the
burdens that go with the benefits of its operations, "as a matter of justice or fairness").
57. See Jones v. Hart, 90 Eng. Rep. 1255 (K.B. 1698)). ("The act of the servant is the act of
his master, where he acts by authority of the master").
58. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 1-2, 219-20, 228-29, 230-31 (1958)
(restating the familiar master/servant formulation) with RESTATEMENT (THtRD) OF AGENCY §§ 7.03,
7.07, 7.08 (2006) (advancing an employer/employee formulation). See also, Oliver Wendell
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commonly understood in both concept and content, and it seems to
have passed over any concern that it be limited to torts causing
physical injury so that it might well apply to acts of infringement
of intellectual property. 59 It is fairly routinely applied in cases of
true agency relationships (further characterized as being of the
master/servant type), and also in cognate cases of true partnerships
and joint ventures where the parties are co-owners of the items
causing the offense and are co-sharers of control over the agents or
instruments within the firm that are the cause of the offense.
Much, but not all, of what passes as "secondary liability" outside
of intellectual property law, and especially in tort law, appears to
be some sort of application of the agency-based vicarious liability
rules of respondeat superior.60 This occurs to such an extent that
"vicarious liability" seems almost to be the default term for
secondary liability in the general law.

Holmes, Jr., Agency, 4 HARV. L. REV. 345, 347-51 (1891) (giving a version of the doctrine); John
Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History, 7 HARV. L. REV. 315, 330-36, 391-99
(1894) (giving a somewhat different version); J. DENNIS HYNES & MARK J. LOEWENSTEIN,
AGENCY, PARTNERSHIP, AND THE LLC: THE LAW OF UNINCORPORATED BusINEss ENTERPRISES
137-270 (7th ed. 2006) (including the prior references and commenting on the state of the law).
59. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, supra note 58 § 219 (referring, in the
"black letter" simply to "torts" of a servant committed while acting within the scope of
employment); Dratler, supra note 30 (observing that infringement of intellectual property rights is
very much like a tort).
60. See generally DOBBS, supra note 44 at §§ 333-340 (addressing the topic "Vicarious
liability of the innocent principal" under what largely comprises principles derived from agency law
rules of vicarious-style, or respondeat superior, secondary liability, as applied in the tort context).
Certain applications of secondary liability in tort, however, do not easily fit within the agency rules.
See id. at § 340 (including within a topic entitled "other bases for vicarious liability" such odds and
ends as bailments, owner-in-the-car and owner consent statutes, family relationships, concerted
action, conspiracy, and aiding, abetting and encouraging). I have included the concerted action,
conspiracy and aiding and abetting cases as part of the fault-based secondary liability subcategory
(contributory or inducement-style) in Section . 2.a. supra; and I will include the others in the
"policy-based" style of secondary liability in Section 1.2.d infra. There are yet other situations in
which a non-actor might be liable in tort for the actions of another, but clearly outside of any notion
of vicarious or contributory liability. See id. at §§ 314-32 (addressing the topic entitled "Nonaction
and Contract: Rescue and Protection" and giving examples of non-actors liable for actions of
another, but outside of any agency-derived vicarious-style secondary liability). I include these
among the "policy-based" or "hostage-style" secondary liability subcategories in Sections I.A.2.d
and I.A.2.e. below. Of course, Professor Dobbs is well aware of the distinctions being made herein,
and he uses "vicarious liability" as a generic term, and "respondeatsuperior" as a species. See id
at 906. The equivocal usage, which is endemic in the law of secondary liability makes it all the
more important to strive to clearly delineate separate categories, assuming there was some reason
for the law's creation of separate categories in the first place.
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The normal agency-derived rules for vicarious liability clearly
apply to cases of copyright infringement. 6 ' The normal agency
rules almost certainl, must apply to trademark 62 and patent
infringement as well. However, to be faithful to its transplanted
roots, this doctrine must be limited to real agenc' relationships, 64
further characterized as a master/servant type. Moreover, the
servant must be acting within the scope of employment; 66 and (of
course) the servant must be liable to the master in any case in
67
which the misconduct was not actually authorized by the master.
In addition, all the ordinary limitations must, presumably, be
imported from agency law (and as transposed from agency to the
general law of torts) into the intellectual property domain as
61. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Greene Co., 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963) ("It is quite
clear, for example, that the normal agency rule of respondeat superior applies to copyright
infringement by a servant within the scope of his employment.").
62. See generally Hard Rock Ca6 Licensing Corp. v. Concession Services, Inc., 955 F.2d
1143 (7th Cir. 1992); and cf Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 853-54 (1982)
(implying as much: noting that when the manufacturer "does not control" the distributor, there is
still room to consider contributory liability). One might suppose that a manufacturer in a
controlling relationship to a distributor might be vicariously liable under normal agency,
partnership, or joint enterprise theories. HardRock, 955 F.2d at 1150.
63. As to what might actually constitute the "normal agency rule," It should be noted that the
majority of the historical case law dealt with the question of secondary liability of the master for
torts committed by the agent causing physical harm. One might assume that the normal agency
rules are appropriate for copyright (and patent or trademark) offenses, and so one can simply
substitute the expression "infringement" in place of the generalized formulation "torts." Or one
might determine deliberately to design a modified rule that might be more nearly fitting for
intellectual property, see infra section IV.
64. That is, the actor must be an agent of the non-acting party. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY, supra note 58, § 1.
65. Although the fact of agency is a necessary condition, it is not sufficient. The actor must
also be a servant-type of agent. Id. at §§ 2, 219-20. Or there must be, if courts embrace it, a
relationship answering to the revised nomenclature (or revised substance) endorsed by the new
restatement. See supra note 58 (referring to the employer-employee labels now used in the
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY).

66. This requires consideration of the old familiar "frolic and detour" cases and other
situations in which the servant deviates from the scope of employment. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
AGENCY, supra note 58, at §§ 228-29. It also implicates the problem of servants who act, not only
without authority, but contrary to express instructions. It is not always the case that a master has a
duty to investigate and to monitor her employees against the possibility they might be engaging in
criminal acts or intentional torts. Cf id., § 231 (stating the limited circumstances in which a
criminal or intentionally tortuous act might be within the scope of employment); Caremark Int'l Inc.
Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del.Ch. 1996) (suggesting, in the course of approving a settlement
agreement, that though it might be rational to settle even a baseless claim, there might be no cause
of action stated and there might be no generalized duty to take affirmative steps to prevent hidden
illegal acts by employees).
67. E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY, supra note 58, § 399 (a principal whose agent
has violated duties has an appropriate remedy against the agent).
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well-that is, there must be a tort, and the vicarious liability
imposed must be consistent with ordinary limits of tort law. Chief
among these must be the still "classic general rule" of tort law by
which defendants are not directly liable for a failure to prevent68a
harm to a particular individual, notwithstanding foreseeability
(or actual knowledge) that the harm is about to occur. 69 Of course,
the master is liable for the torts of the servant, and it could be said
this is a case of the master's not preventing (or controlling) the
servant; 70 but the servant is not liable for failure to prevent some
sort of harm-there still must be direct liability before there can be
any vicarious liability. I acknowledge that some of these cases
cross the line between what I have called contributory-style and
vicarious-style secondary liability, but it remains important to
point out the provenance of the various rules and to attempt a
rational taxonomy notwithstanding some crossover cases. I will
treat some of the crossover cases as constituting a "policy-style"
subcategory of secondary liability, and as an important factor in
designing rational rules for secondary liability for new
technological uses.
Expanded Vicarious-style (softened and expanded for
copyright). One who [1] with the right and ability to supervise an
actor, has [2] an obvious and direct financial interest in the
exploitation of copyrighted materials by the actor, and [3] is a
beneficiary of the impermissible exploitation71will be secondarily
liable for copyright infringement by the actor.
68. There is room, as well, to draw increased attention to the equally fundamental tort law
doctrines of proximate cause and culpability. See Jay Dratler, supra note 30.
69. DOBBS, supra note 44 at 853 (stating the rule and amplifying it: "the defendant sees an
unsighted person about to step in front of an approaching car. The defendant could prevent his
injury by a word or touch, without danger to the defendant and without delaying the defendant's
own progress. But he does nothing to prevent injury, which in fact follows. The general rule
applies to relieve the defendant of any liability." (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314,
illus. 1 (1979))).
70. Even here, the "scope of employment" limitation must serve as a proxy for foreseeability,
because patterns of conduct and the scope of risk within the scope of employment can be within the
general ken of the principal/master. Likewise the general bar against imposing liability for "failure
to prevent" can still be upheld insofar as the principal/master can fairly be said to be within the
ordinary tort law exception that applies when a person has undertaken to act or has put events in
motion, thereby assuming a duty to intervene, supervise or otherwise prevent subsequent offending
consequences.
71. Shapiro, 316 F.2d at 304. ("Many of the elements which have given rise to the doctrine of
[genuine agency-style] respondeat superior.. . may also be evident in factual settings other than
that of a technical employer-employee relationship. When [1]the right and ability to supervise
coalesce with [2] an obvious and direct financial interest in the exploitation of copyrighted
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This "expanded-for-copyright" style of vicarious liability is
clearly not the familiar rule of agency law, and everyone knows it
is not (or at least the court first enunciating this version of
secondary liability knew it). 72 One might suppose that the softer
notion of a mere [1] "right and ability to supervise" might loosely
answer to the more rigorous agency law requirement of the
master's right to control "the physical conduct in the performance
of the services." 73 Likewise, the notions of [2] "obvious and direct
financial interest" in the infringing activity and of [3] being the
"beneficiary" of the exploitation might roughly answer to the
agency requirement of "acting on behalf' of a true
master/principal in a truly consensual master-servant type of
agency relationship.74 Together these factors of control and benefit
must have contributed to the legal conclusion that it is "just and
fair" to hold the employer (or master) accountable for acts taken
on her behalf by an employee (or servant).75 By extension, the
softer notions of supervision and direct financial interest must be
what the court originating the concept meant by observing that
"many of the elements" giving rise to vicarious liability in the true
(or, "technical") master-servant relationship are also present in the
peculiar circumstances where "the purposes" of copyright law are
by imposing an expanded form of secondary
"best effectuated"
76
liability.
Perhaps all of this expanded-for-copyright style of secondary
liability serves, at least in the context of copyright law, to afford a
relationship-based style of secondary liability which, like true
agency-derived vicarious liability, might complement the faultbased contributory-style and inducement-style of secondary
liability. If so designed, then the rules for secondary liability in

materials---even in the absence of actual knowledge that the copyright monopoly is being impaired.
. --the purposes of copyright law may be best effectuated by the imposition of liability [3] on the
beneficiary of that exploitation." ).
72. See id. (including the court's clear statement that it was confronted with a case "other
than" a "technical" employer-employee relationship). It should go without saying, but it is clear
that this "softened-for-copyright" style of vicarious liability is also clearly not the familiar
contributory or inducement style either, because there is no requirement that there be knowledge (as
would be required for either contributory or inducement style).
73. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY, supra note 58, § 220(1).
74. Id.at § I(I).
75. My thesis continues to be that the general rule requires there be circumstances in which it
is "just" to hold another liable for the torts of an actor.
76. See supra note 71 (quoting the language used by the Second Circuit).
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intellectual property might be supposed to be rationally derived,
with the end of determining two general sets of circumstances in
which it is "just" to hold one person accountable for the
infringements of an actor: (1) when the one is in a relationship
with the other, either in a true master/servant situation, or else in
an expanded-for-copyright style of secondary liability, or (2) when
the one is at fault for materially contributing or inducing the
infringement of the actor, with knowledge of it. Each of these two
fonts has a driving rationale and also has some self-limiting factors
to prevent secondary liability from becoming too great for
incidental third parties to bear.
It is interesting to observe that there has been substantial
resistance to any extension of this expanded-for-copyright version
of relationship-based secondary liability to trademark law. In fact,
the leading cases seem explicitly to forbid it.77 It is doubtful there
is any need for such a softened doctrine in patent law.
c. Consensual-Style Secondary Liability (the suretyship
type).
Having already discussed fault-based and relationship-based
secondary liability, it might be time to conclude this section, but
there is at least one other type of secondary liability that is well
known in the general law. Some people actually choose to accept
secondary liability. Those who deliberately agree to guarantee or
act as surety for the debt of another 7 typically have either
77. Inwood might be read to limit secondary liability in trademark cases to active inducementstyle and also to only that contributory-style as is accompanied by explicit, actual knowledge of
specific acts of on-going trademark infringement. See supra note 49. See also Hard Rock Caf6
Licensing Corp. v. Concession Services, Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1149 (7th Cir. 1992) (requiring that
the person secondarily liable must either know or have reason to know of the infringement and also
holding that "willful blindness" ("to be willfully blind, a person must suspect wrongdoing and
deliberately fail to investigate") would constitute "reason to know"; but that mere failure to take
reasonable precautions would not (there is no duty "to seek out and prevent violations."). HardRock
Cafg clearly holds there is no such thing as an expanded-for-copyright version of vicarious liability
in trademark law). Id.at 1149-50 (labeling the theory "the more expansive doctrine of vicarious
liability applicable to copyright violations."); see also D.S.P.T. Int'l, Inc. v. Nahum, 2008 WL
754803 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (assessing attorneys' fees against a non-prevailing party who asserted
secondary liability in a trademark case based upon expansive notions of vicarious liability and in the
absence of any true agency, partnership, or apparent partnership basis for asserting any true agencybased relationship-style of vicarious liability) (my thanks to Professor Mark Bartholomew for
bringing the D.S.P. T. case to my attention).
78. A "surety" is a person who is liable for the duty of another person, and it was once said
that a person whose liability for the duty of another person is conditioned on the failure of the other
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demanded certain rather obvious protections, or else have
benefited from the law's occasional imposition of protections and
limitations. When the law determines to impose secondary liability
in intellectual property without regard to the parties' wishes, it
might do well to notice the sensible protections that might go
along with the imposition when parties are thinking about their
relative risks and benefits.
In addition to the limitations in the general law already
mentioned in this Article, 79 those protections that have been
recognized in suretyship law are another likely source 8of0
limitations. Among those protections are the right to exoneration,
reimbursement,8 1 restitution, 82 recourse, 83 and subrogation. 84 Other
limitations on consensual secondary liability are those that once
were recognized as the strict suretyship defenses (strictissimi
juris),85 including full or partial releases from liability in the event
of any non-consented action between the primary debtor and the
obligee that might impair the surety's rights of recourse or

person to perform is a "guarantor." E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRAcTS 373 (3rd. ed. 1999). But
that terminology is not always maintained, and I will use the word "surety" in its broad sense to
include a guarantor. See id. (adopting the same broad usage); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY § 1 cmt. c (1996) (using "secondary obligor" as the generic term
because the former distinctions between guarantor and surety have been much debated, and
blurred); see generally U.C.C.,§ 3-419(c) (2008) (preserving the substantive distinction in the case
of a signature accompanied by words indicating unambiguously that a party is "guaranteeing
collection" rather than payment, in which case the secondary obligor is entitled to exoneration,
being obligated only if execution of judgment against the principal debtor is returned unsatisfied, or
upon like conditions).
79. See supra section I.A.2.a. (referring to limitations on the fault-based secondary liability
doctrines); supra I.A.2.b. (alluding to limitations on the relationship-based secondary liability
doctrines, built into the fundamental requirement that there must be a master/servant relationship, or
that there must be an occasion to use the expanded-for-copyright version).
80. The creditor must first seek payment from the primary debtor before making demand
upon the secondary debtor. This might go so far as requiring not only demand upon the primary,
but also the institution of a lawsuit pursued to judgment, followed by attempts to collect upon the
judgment, resulting in an unsatisfied judgment. U.C.C., supra note 78, § 3-419(c); see FRED H.
MILLER & ALVIN C. HARRELL, THE LAW OF MODERN PAYMENT SYSTEMS 199 (2003).
81. The person secondarily liable would have a right to reimbursement of expenses in
resisting the creditor. MILLER & HARRELL, supra note 80; JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S.
SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 487 (5th ed. 2000).
82. The person secondarily liable would have a right to restitution (in respect of expenses not
reimbursed but which provided a benefit). Id.
83. The person secondarily liable would have a right of recourse against the primary debtor,
including against any collateral security. Id.
84. The person secondarily liable would have a right to stand in the position of the creditor
against the primary debtor, including under any negotiable instrument. Id
85. DOUGLAS J. WHALEY, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON PAYMENT LAW 125 (8th ed. 2008).
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subrogation. These defenses have, at various times, released the
surety if the primary debtor were released,86 if the time of payment
were changed, if any collateral were released or damaged, or the
right of recourse were impaired, 8 and89 if certain other changes
were made to the underlying obligation.
Suretyship is consensual in nature. Its application to
secondary liability in intellectual property cases might take a
moment to appreciate, because the cases of infringement do not
obviously seem to raise issues of consensual obligation. But just as
the person secondarily liable as a voluntary surety is a person who
is not otherwise a debtor, and just as the surety will answer for the
default of another, so also the limitations on such liability are
perhaps relevant, at least when it comes to potential extensions of
secondary liability for new technological uses in copyright or
trademark law. It would not be unreasonable to consider the
suretyship cases as limiting or boundary cases, suggesting the sort
of protections or limitations that might be designed into any
rational extension of secondary liability were such liability
conceived as a guaranty90 made and designed by the immediate
parties to the transaction.
There is something to the notion that a proprietor of
intellectual property ought first to seek redress against the direct
infringer (something akin to the surety's right of exoneration).
Likewise, perhaps something akin to reimbursement or restitution
might be fashioned. This would not be identical to the suretyship
case, but might be a form of reimbursement or restitution payable
by the proprietor to the person secondarily liable to compensate
for the real or imputed costs of that person's forced cooperation in
the cause of enforcing intellectual property rights against third
party infringers.
At the very least, any account of secondary liability in
intellectual property cases depending upon a derivation from
general principles of common law should not omit the consentbased secondary liability rules of the suretyship cases. It is
certainly "just" to hold one party accountable for the debts of
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. The person secondarily liable is, in effect, guaranteeing the good conduct of the direct
infringer.
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another where there has been an agreement to do so, accompanied
by sensible safeguards.
d. Policy-Style.
It must be acknowledged that there is a fertile ground of
"vicarious" or "secondary" liability throughout the law, both in the
general law 9 ' and in copyright, patent and trademark. Many of the
common law antecedents fit neatly within the categories already
given-fault-based,
relationship-based,
or
consent-based.
Nevertheless, on a candid reading, a significant number of cases
cannot be cabined so neatly. 92 Some cases cannot be explained on
any sort of contributory or inducement fault-basis, and cannot be
explained on any relationship-basis relying upon either
recognizable agency or respondeat superior style of vicarious
liability, or upon any extended-for-copyright style. There is a
tendency to fudge on respondeat superior cases, and an almost
whimsically cavalier approach to formulating the rules for
93
vicarious-style secondary liability in intellectual property cases.

91. Consider, for example, not only sections I.A.2.a & b. but also further analogies from
criminal law (accomplice liability, vicarious liability, enterprise liability, pre-crime accessories
before the fact, post-crime accessories after the fact, misprision, compounding, felony murder,
conspiracies, solicitations, and attempts); tort law (its own version of "respondeat superior" and
"vicarious liability" either identical to, or different from the agency-style versions, concerted action
and conspiracies, aiding, abetting and encouraging, and applications of perhaps special rules
attributing liability in cases of sexual harassment or assault, abusive caretakers, ship captains and
automobile drivers), contract law (consensual undertakings of secondary liability in surety,
guarantee and indemnity), the law of corporations, partnerships and other firms (versions of
respondeatsuperiorthat might be identical to, or which might differ more or less from some of the
other versions), and yet other examples that could be multiplied.
92. See generally DOBBS, supra note 44 at § 340 (including within a topic entitled "other
bases for vicarious liability" such odds and ends as bailments, owner-in-the-car and owner consent
statutes, family relationships, concerted action, conspiracy, and aiding, abetting and encouraging).
Although courts seem to be applying nominal agency rules, these cases are better explained on
policy bases masquerading as respondeat superior. These are unnamed, but real examples of
designed law, of a free choice of rules that are built or "coded" deliberately by judges. It would be
better for any such choices if they were first specified before being built.
93. The Court's casual usage in Grokster might well be overlooked, since the case was
decided on the basis of inducement-style secondary liability, but it still seems bad form to have said
that "[o]ne infringes contributorily by intentionally inducing or encouraging direct infringement...
and infringes vicariouslyby [1]profitingfrom direct infringement while [2] declining to exercise a
right to stop or limit it." 545 U.S. at 930 (emphasis added). The Court's formulation of vicarious
liability in copyright cases shifts the language of the prior relationship-style (expanded for
copyright) liability cases, see supra notes 71 and 72, and also seems to incline against the analogous
general rule of tort law that inaction is no offense, see supra notes 45 and 69. By so shifting the
language, the Court blurs some substantive distinctions--in the prior cases, it is the "profit" which
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We will conclude this section, at I.A.2.d. very nearly where we
began in section I.A.1. The general rule already given at the
outset, but with a slight twist, may be as good a description as any
of the results of the "at large" cases. It may very well be part of
existing law that there is, in fact, some room for candidly
announcing a rule for policy-style secondary liability that can be
stated as follows:
Policy-style secondary liability: One is secondarily liable for
the infringement of another if (1) there is an infringement by
another, and (2) if it is "just" to hold that one accountable for the
other's infringement, with "justice" being something inexplicable,
unmoored and non-specific.
Perhaps the only difference between this version of the rule
and the general version of the rule first set forth at the beginning
of this Article 94 is its differing assumptions. If it can be said that
the general rule is derived from the specific cases, categories and
subcategories, then the content of "justice" is circumscribed: it is
"just" to hold another liable if (but only if) there is a fault-based
rationale, as in contributory or inducement-style; or if there is a
relationship-based rationale, as in genuine agency based
respondeatsuperior or even in extended-for-copyright vicariousstyle; or if there is some trace of a consensual basis, as suggested
by the suretyship-style of secondary liability. But if the
presumption of "justice" defined by its common law derivation in
general law is removed, and if it is imagined that the normative
inquiry is reduced to some sort of unqualified, unchecked,
indeterminate license to imagine some sort of chimerical "justice"
then the identically-stated rule becomes wide open to what might
candidly be called a "policy" interpretation. It is in this last sense
that I present nearly the same formal statement of the general rule
with which we began, and yet I propose that it constitutes yet
another style of secondary liability.

must be direct, as in a "direct financial interest", and the prior cases emphasize the positive right to
supervise conduct rather than the negative right to stop it. See supra note 71. One might suppose the
Court's unintentionally loose language does no harm, until one notices that the loose inclination
evidenced by this language is taken up by a vigorous dissenting opinion in the Perfect 10 case. See
infra Section I.B.2. (discussing Perfect 10 in the aftermath of Grokster).
94. The general rule is set forth in section IA.I. supra. The various specific subcategories set
forth in section I.A.2. supra were offered under the assumption that it is only with reference to them
that the circumstances in which it is "just" to hold another person liable can actually be understood
in a more or less rule-specific manner.
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This might explain some of the cases in tort law holding
persons secondarily liable in the context of bailments (or loaned
car cases) treated as if they were agency relationships, 95 owner-inthe-car and owner consent statutes treated as if they were actually
grounded upon some agency basis for the result, and family
relationships treated as if they were really illustrative of agency
law. 9 6 In addition, it might explain at least the motive behind some
of the cases in tort law seeming to hold persons liable for inaction
and unaccompanied
97 by any ordinary factor that creates a special
duty to intervene.
In cases such as these it is hard to say that there really are any
fault-based,
relationship-based,
or consent-based
factors
supporting secondary liability, at least if those factors were to be
determined according to any technologically-neutral basis. It
might be well simply to say there is some non-neutral "policy" and
be done with it. At the same time, and having announced why
there is a non-neutrally derived policy for a new law to cover the
new technological uses of, for example, the automobile, it would
not be hard to save agency law (and secondary liability law)
simply by announcing that there is a special "law of the
automobile" just because automobiles seem to create problems
that their owners ought to deal with, notwithstanding the absence
of any existing law to force that result. 98 The non-neutral result
might simply be a consequence of a non-neutral choice to prefer
the side of the injured to the side of the otherwise non-liable
owner, and to do so by holding the owner secondarily liable for
the driving of the person at the wheel of the car, regardless of prior
rules of secondary liability.
95. See, e.g., Gorton v. Doty, 69 P.2d 136 (Idaho 1937) (transforming a loaned car into an
agency relationship in order to hold the owner of the car liable) (the court observed, citing prior
authority, that "the fact of ownership alone... establishes a prima facie case against the owner for
the reason that the presumption arises that the driver is the agent of the owner..."). See also supra
note 60 (collecting other examples).
96. See supra note 60 (reciting examples).
97. Id.; see also supra notes 45 and 69 (noting an expression of the ordinary "failure to
intervene" standard).
98. This might be an illegitimate, but at least an honest approach to law reform. But it might
even be, were it done openly and with a specifically enunciated set of rules limited to "the law of
the automobile," a legitimate development of private law confronted with a new technology. Had
the development been a forthright, non-deceptive accommodation of the law to a new technology, it
might constitute an adaptation of the sort long thought to be within the disciplined range of common
law judges. At the least, it would have identified the problem, the short-comings of existing law,
and the reason for the departure from expected results under existing law.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2009

31

Akron Intellectual Property Journal, Vol. 3 [2009], Iss. 1, Art. 3
AKRON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL

[3:43

Alternatively, it might serve better to identify some specific
aspect of "justice" which is supported by the application of
secondary liability. Perhaps secondary liability is "just" because it
is lawful, right, fair, or good for something. Perhaps secondary
liability is "just" in a frankly instrumental sense of the word,
because it supports some conventional interest of the stronger
party involved in the case.' 0 0 Perhaps secondary liability is "just"
only in the unmoored modem usage of the word "justice" which
assigns it to explain any anomaly that is otherwise inexplicable in
the law, or to explain some sort of "efficiency" or analytical
relationship imagined to be discernable in the decided cases. 1° 1 In
any event, it would not hurt to explicitly identify what the court
has in mind.
Until there is a more general consensus on what any modem
juridical agent means by the word "justice," it would almost
certainly be better, at least in the context of current legal
conventions, simply to recognize that some existing cases already
constitute a non-neutral "policy" basis for imposing secondary
liability, and then to explain what, if any, sensible or rational
policy might be in play.
e. An Imaginary Horrible (or is it?): Hostage-Style
There are some authorities, most of them under what might
fairly be described as ancient or discarded law,' 0 2 for a hostagestyle of secondary liability. It takes little imagination to understand
that if one is held hostage for the actions of another, with death or
forfeiture of liberty to follow, 10 3 there will be an impact on
conduct and perhaps there might be a decided influence on the
other (or at least that the hostage would have a strong incentive to
99. See Thomas C. Folsom, Evaluating SupernaturalLaw: An Inquiry into the Health of
Nations (the Restatement of the Obvious, Part fl), 21 REGENT U. L. REV. 105, 138-42 and App. A
at § 401-404 (2008) (filling in some terms omitted from the existing restatements of law, and
defining a version of "justice").
100. Id. at 142-43 and App. A at § 406-09 (defining another version of "justice").
101. Id. at 143 and App. A at § 410-13 (defining yet another version of"justice").
102. Indeed, some have traced the earliest contracts in Anglo-American and European law to
an ancient origin in hostage-taking. See, OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, Lecture VII,
247-50 (1881) (starting with the contract of suretyship, and observing that "the surety of ancient
law was the hostage" and proceeding through Charlemagne, Henry I, King Canute and "the story of
Huon of Bordeaux"-"Charlemagne cries out 'I summon hither the pledges for Huon. I will hang
them, and they shall have no ransom').
103. See infra Appendix A ("Prizes! Prizes!").
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exercise whatever control he or she might have upon the other). It
is curious, and productive, to consider hostage-style secondary
liability as suggesting at least one more boundary condition to the
concept of secondary liability.
If the modem suretyship, consensual-type of secondary
liability affords a boundary at one pole or extreme, based on what
someone would rationally demand if asked to accept such
exposure, then the ancient hostage-style affords another boundary
at the other extreme, where liability is imposed based on a pure act
of force or will on the part of the person taking the hostages, and
who thereby forces secondary liability upon the hostages. As in
the case of consensual secondary liability and policy-style
secondary liability, the hostage is held to guarantee that there be
an absence of offense by another person. Hostage-style might
differ chiefly in its candid admission that the rule is based upon
force and upon the interest of the hostage-taker rather than upon
any more abstract concept of "justice." However, even here,
commentators have claimed there are certain rules or limitations
upon what happens to the hostage.104
Indeed, it might be asked whether there is a tendency by
which the results, if not the analysis, of Grokster, Napster (or even
Google and others) can be understood on the hostage-style basis at
least as well as on any other. If so, that tendency is probably a bad
thing, at least for new technological uses that require some capitalintensive investment on the part of its providers and developers
and that provide tangible benefits to the general public. It might be
doubted that hostage-style secondary liability will contribute to the
long term flourishing of new technological uses. Any designed
104. Observing that, according to the law of nations, there is "in the way of security, another
precaution, of very ancient institution, and much used among nations-which is to require
hostages," M. Vattel lays down certain rules or norms: hostages are to be persons "of consequence"
to be detained until the promised third party performance has been rendered; there is no other right
over them than that of securing their persons, "in order to detain them until the entire
accomplishment" of the other's duty; they ought not to be ill-used; they must be restored upon
performance by the other. EMMERICH DE VATrEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, Book I, §§ 245-48
(Chitty, trans. 1863) (1758). As an interesting admission that ultimately force, rather than consent,
is the basis of the hostage-rules, it is said that a subject "who is nominated [by the sovereign] for
that purpose [of standing as hostage] is bound to obey" and that a subject "can be given as a hostage
against his will" (while a "vassal cannot be constrained to go as a hostage, unless he be at the same
time a subject."). Id. at § 252. And yet, even so, and even when bound to go by force "the hostage
is entitled to be defrayed and indemnified at the public charge." Id. Older laws or norms were more
severe. See generally CICERO, DE OFFICIIS, Bk. I1, xxxii. (recounting the various obligations of
sworn envoys and hostages on parole).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2009

33

Akron Intellectual Property Journal, Vol. 3 [2009], Iss. 1, Art. 3
AKRON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL

solution ought at least to consider the unintended consequences of
decisions that might accidentally point in the direction of hostagestyle secondary liability.
B.

Grokster (Sony) and Perfect 10

Section I.A. might be taken as a sort of "prequel" to the recent
cases. However, because the recent cases paint on a canvass
already prepared by preexisting law, the recent cases can now be
better understood and more concisely presented. Although the
Court first addressed contributory liability (and secondary liability
more gnerally) in modem copyright law in its Sony decision in
1984 ,15 itpresumed the existence of a well-developed law of
secondary liability, as I believe is fairly outlined in Section I.A. Of
the four cases that are being discussed in this Symposium issue, I
will concentrate on Grokster10 6 (as it elaborates on Sony) and
Perfect 10 107 (as it elaborates on the prior cases and perhaps
foreshadows the trademark proprietor's claim in Tiffany' 08).
1. Grokster (and Sony)
In Grokster the Court explains, glosses and elaborates on
certain aspects of the Sony'0 9 standard for fault-based infringement
in copyright." l0 Before picking up Grokster, it may be helpful to
review Sony. That case, decided in 1984, involved the Betamax
video tape recorder introduced by Sony and used by some of its
purchasers to copy some of the copyrighted shows of Universal
City Studios and the Walt Disney Company that were broadcast
free of charge on over-the-air television. The Court noted that the
plaintiffs-respondents, Universal and Disney "do not seek relief
against the Betamax users who have allegedly infringed their
copyrights."' 11 Instead, the Court observed, the plaintiffs charged
105. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
106. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
107. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv. Assoc., 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007).
108. Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
109. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
110. Sony was the first modem case to reach the Supreme Court, and so in that sense may be
said to have set a standard. Other cases are discussed at section I.B.2. infra. See supra section I.A. 1.
for my statement of the general rule, and section I.A.2.a. for my statement of the rules of "faultbased" secondary liability (including contributory and inducement-style).
111. Id. at 434. But see Jessica Litman, supra note 25 (recounting the involvement of one
William Griffiths, a client who owned a Betamax and who agreed to be sued as a nominal defendant
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Sony with "contributory infringement," ' 1 2 and sought to prove that
"users of the Betamax have infringed their copyrights
'' 13 and that
Sony should be held responsible for that infringement."
Reversing the Ninth Circuit's holding of liability against
Sony, the Court addressed several issues, including the standard
for "imposition of liability for copyright infringements on certain
parties who have not themselves engaged in the infringing
activity." 114 The Court observed that "vicarious liability is
imposed in virtually all areas of the law. .

. ."'

"

The Court

concluded its sentence by adding that "the concept of contributory
infringement is merely a species of the broader problem of
identifying the circumstances in which it is just
to hold one
116
individual accountable for the actions of another."
In what seemed like a resounding holding in favor of what
was characterized as noncommercial home copying, the Court
labeled the lawsuit as an "unprecedented attempt to impose
copyright liability upon the distributors of copying equipment,"
and rejected the attempt. 1 7 The Court rested upon the analogy to
contributory liability in patent law, which imposed contributory
liability but exempted the sale of staple articles of commerce from
such liability."'
Sony included a rather clear statement of a standard for (or at
least an apparent bar against) contributory liability: "Accordingly,
the sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of
commerce, does not constitute contributory infringement if the
product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes.
on a promise that the plaintiffs "would seek no damages from him" in the event they prevailed in
the lawsuit.)
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. 1d.at435.
115. Id. (emphasis added, apparently using "vicarious liability" as the genus to describe
secondary liability outside of IP). See supra note 31 (providing a representative sampling).
116. Id. (emphasis added). This enunciates what I have called the "general rule" or "two-part"
version of secondary liability. See suprasection I.A. 1.
117. Id. at 421, Litman, supra note 25 at 379-80.
118. Id. at 428; see 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2006) (providing that whoever offers to sell, or sells, or
imports a component "constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be
especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple
article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial non-infringing use, shall be liable as a
contributory infringer.") (emphasis added); and cf id. § 271(b) (providing that anyone who
"actively induces infiingement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.") (emphasis added). This
tracks what I have referred to as the "contributory" subcategory of fault-based secondary liability.
See suprasection I.A.2.a.
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Indeed, it need merely be capable of substantial non-infringing
uses."' "19 Because some copyright proprietors consented to viewer
taping in order to watch shows the viewer might otherwise miss,
for subsequent, noncommercial family viewing at a more
convenient time (a phenomenon labeled "authorized timeshifting"), and because other conduct (some "non-authorized timeshifting") was either non-infringing or else privileged as a fair use,
the Court held there were20"substantial non-infringing" uses of the
Betamax video recorder. 1

The contribution of Grokster's unanimous majority decision
in 2005 was to follow Sony and yet at the same time to find a basis
for potential secondary liability against Grokster and StreamCast,
the distributors of peer-to-peer (P2P) software typically (so it was
said) used by consumers impermissibly to copy MP3 music files
and to traffic in such files over the Internet. 121 Reversing the Ninth
Circuit (which had affirmed the trial court's disposition of the case
in Grokster's and StreamCast's favor on cross motions for
summary judgment on the authority of Sony, and upon the belief
there was a "substantial non-infringing use" for the P2P software,
among other reasons), 122 Grokster also must stand for the
proposition that Sony, as it stands, is no absolute bar to the
imposition of secondary liability on the provider of software
which enabled peer-to-peer copying of copyrighted musical works
and which might have some non-infringing use. 123 The Court

119. Id, at 442 (this tracks the "contributory" rule). See suprasection I.A.2.a.
120. Id. at 443.
121. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005). After remand,
the case resulted in the shut-down of the offending distributors.
122. The Ninth Circuit applied a contributoryliability analysis under which "a defendant was
liable as a contributory infringer when it [1] had knowledge of direct infringement and [2]
materially contributed to the infringement." Id. at 927. But the court apparently erred by reading
Sony "as holding that distribution of a commercial product capable of substantial non-infringing
uses could not give rise to contributory liability unless the distributor had actual knowledge of
specific instances of infringement and failed to act on that knowledge." Id. (emphasis added). The
Ninth Circuit held that the defendants Grokster and StreamCast were not liable because they had no
such specific knowledge (because the architecture of their system, unlike Napster's notorious
system, was decentralized). See id. at 928. The Ninth Circuit also held that the defendants had not
materially contributed (because "it was the users themselves who searched for, retrieved, and stored
the infringing files, with no involvement by the defendants beyond providing the software in the
first place."). Id. In addition, the Ninth Circuit applied a vicarious infringement analysis, but "held
against liability because the defendants did not monitor or control the use of software, had no
agreed-right or current ability to supervise its use, and had no independent duty to police
infringement." Id.
123. Id. at922.
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announced: "We hold that one who distributes a device with the
object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by
clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster
infringement, 1is
24 liable for the resulting acts of infringement by
third parties."'
In reaching its holding, and remanding for further
proceedings, Grokster confirmed a standard taxonomy of "indirect
liability" or "secondary liability." According to the Court, such
liability may be triggered "[1] contributorily by intentionally
inducing or encouraging direct infringement"'125 or "[2] vicariously
by profiting from direct 1infringement
while declining to exercise a
26
right to stop or limit it.'
In so labeling the various grounds while apparently relying
upon only one of them, Grokster followed the lead of Sony insofar
as Sony itself had explicitly provided that "the lines between direct
infringement, contributory infringement and vicarious liability are
not clearly drawn." Indeed, Sony itself had noted that any
"...[r]easoned analysis of [the Sony plaintiffs' contributory
infringement claim] necessarily entails consideration of arguments
127
and case law which may be forwarded under the other labels."'
Those labels currently include not only the "vicarious" and
"contributory" tags, but also the "inducement" tag, and perhaps
others. 128 Because Grokster was resolved and remanded by the
Court under the "inducement" label, there was no apparent need
for the Court separately to analyze the contributory and vicarious
liability theories
that had been asserted against Grokster and
29

StreamCast. 1

124. Id.at 919. This tracks what I have referred to as the "inducement" subcategory of
secondary liability. See supra section I.A.2.a.
125. Id.at 930 (emphasis added) citing Gershwin Publ'g. Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt.,
Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971).
126. Id (emphasis added) citing Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304,
307 (2d Cir. 1963). This statement might be a bit loose in respect to vicarious liability. See supra
notes 45 and 93. See supra section I.A. 1. for my statement of the general rule, see section I.A.2.a.
for my statement of the rules of "fault-based" secondary liability (including contributory and
inducement-style), and see section I.A.2.b for my statement of the rules for "relationship-based"
secondary liability (including vicarious and expanded vicarious-style for copyright cases). It may be
significant that the Court mentioned fault
by way of "declining to...
stop... it" which might blur the
longstanding principle that liability does not ordinarily attach to persons who fail to prevent the
occurrence of a tort. See supra section I.A.
127. Id at931, note9.
128. See infra section I.A. (summarizing variants).
129. Id.
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The two concurring opinions' suggested opposite pulls on
Sony. One, which may be called a "broadening concurrence"
suggested Sony could certainly cover more than, and could reach
more attenuated and less egregious conduct than the inducementstyle secondary liability that was presented on the Court's
understanding of the facts of Grokster.r31 The other, which may be
called a "narrowing concurrence" suggested Sony should not be
stretched much further than supported by the rather egregious facts
of Grokster (indeed, on this narrowing reading, even the result 1in
32
Grokster itself might be considered somewhat of a stretch).
Grokster also looked, temporally, both before and after Sony for
case support. It broadly endorsed the major pre-Sony cases of
secondary liability for copyright infringement, 133 and generally
134
acknowledged some of the more significant post-Sony cases.
The unanimous Grokster decision might be no more than
what it seems to be: an inoffensive, well-constructed, ordinary
case, filling out the interstices of secondary liability law in the
circumstances of rather egregious inducement-style fault-based
secondary liability not explicitly addressed by Sony. Of course, its
result was pretty nearly the opposite of Sony 's. On a purely resultdriven calculus, Sony seemed to have broadly protected the
135
distributor of a copying machine against contributory liability,

130. Id. at 942 (Ginsburg, J., concurring, joined by Rehnquist, J., and Kennedy, J.). Id. at 949
(Breyer, J., concurring, joined by Stevens, J., and O'Connor, J.).
131. Id. at 945 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (finding "[tihis case differs markedly from Sony'
because Grokster and StreamCast produced insufficient evidence of substantial non-infringing
uses). The concurring opinion might be read as expansive of Sony because it suggests Grokster
would have been liable even absent evidence of inducement, simply because of no non-infringing
use. Id. at 946. That is, there might be grounds for contributory-style secondary liability, without
having to rest upon the more egregious inducement-style alleged.
132. Id. at 952. (Breyer, J., concurring). This concurrence might be read as narrowing because,
although these concurring Justices believed the "quantities of current lawful [substantial noninfringing] use [of the Grokster defendants' software] roughly approximate to those at issue in
Sony" they concurred in the judgment on the more narrow ground of Grokster's and StreamCast's
inducement of their customers to copy illegally. Sony had not been found to have induced direct
infringement, but Grokster and StreamCast had been alleged to have induced, so therefore no
amount of substantial non-infringing use could preserve the Grokster defendants from liability as
inducers. The narrowing concurrence very strongly suggested that, were it not for the inducement,
Grokster might well have been entitled to judgment of non-liability on the strength of a product that
was at least as "capable" of non-infringing uses as was Sony's.
133. Id. at 943; see also supra notes 18 and 21 (discussing earlier cases of secondary liability
for copyright infringement).
134. Id. at 956 (mentioning the Napster case).
135. See supra note 25 (describing popular readings of the case).
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while Grokster seems to have held liable1 36 the distributors13 7of a
[virtual] copying machine, not terribly different from Sony 'S.
However, perhaps another line between the two really was the
effect of inducement, present in Grokster but not in Sony. 138 This
might explain the "substantial non-infringing use" differential
between the two situations (maybe the Court meant to say only
that there is no absolute bar to liability based merely on a
defendant's claim of "some" non-infringing use, or it may have
meant that non-infringing use is irrelevant where there is
compelling evidence of inducement and no evidence of any other
use for the product). 139 On the other hand, perhaps it was the
"knowing" element attributed with greater force to Grokster as an
inducer than to Sony merely as a contributor. 140 Maybe it was the
136. That is, assuming the probable results upon remand, and as has been manifested by the
ultimate result in the case. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 454 F. Supp.
2d 966, 971 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (observing that the defendants, Grokster and Sharman Networks, had
settled with the plaintiffs, and granting summary judgment against the sole remaining defendant,
StreamCast, on the basis of inducement-style secondary liability).
137. Grokster,545 U.S. at 952 (concurring opinion).
138. Id. at 919 ("We hold that one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use
to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster
infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infiingement by third parties.").
139. Compare Sony, 464 U.S. at 789 (framing the question as whether the Betamax is capable
of "commercially significant" non-infringing uses, and noting that "we need not give precise
content to the question of how much use is commercially significant") (emphasis added) with
Grokster, 545 U.S. at 932 (concluding that "where an article is 'good for nothing else' but
infringement... there is no legitimate public interest in its unlicensed availability, and there is no
injustice in presuming or imputing an intent to infringe..."); see supra text accompanying note 52
(suggesting there is no room for a "substantial non-infringing use" defense in these circumstances).
140. Compare Sony, 464 U.S. at 790-91 (suggesting, perhaps, that Sony might have known
that, in one sample, some 58% of the copyright proprietors authorized "some" home taping and
"almost 20% authorize unrestricted home taping"; and observing that "if the proprietors . . .
welcome the practice, the business of supplying the equipment that makes such copying feasible
should not be stifled simply because the equipment is used by some individuals to make
unauthorized reproductions...") with Grokster, 545 U.S. at 933-35 (explaining that "Sony barred
secondary liability based on presuming or imputing intent to cause infringement solely from the
design or distribution of a product capable of substantial lawful use, which the distributor knows is
in fact used for infringement" but that "nothing in Sony requires courts to ignore evidence of intent
if there is such evidence, and the case was never meant to foreclose rules of fault-based liability
derived from the common law"); see supra text accompanying note 52 (exploring the differences
between contributory-style secondary liability, where non-infringing use is an important factor, and
inducement-style secondary liability where substantial non-infringing use would seem to be
irrelevant).
If the standard for inducement-style secondary liability is the clear and manifest active
encouragement or active inducement as presented long ago in Kalem, see supra note 18, and if my
formulation of "actively encourages" or "actively induces" is a fair statement of the rule for
inducement-style secondary liability, see supra note 47, it follows that the Court must have
concluded that Sony's incidental advertising and promotion of a home library of tapes did not, in the
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"justice" element which rendered it more "just" to hold Grokster
responsible for the misconduct of others than to hold Sony liable,
where Grokster was more nearly part of the infringing activity
than was Sony by virtue of Grokster's distribution of a device
"with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright as
shown by clear expression
or other affirmative steps taken to
4'
infringement.'
foster
2. Perfect 10 (consequences of Grokster).
Perfect 10 142 is an example of the perhaps unexpected
consequences of Grokster. It was a 2-1 decision in the Ninth
Circuit that affirmed a finding of non-liability against Visa, a
credit card issuer, 143 based upon allegations of contributory,
14
vicarious and inducement-style secondary copyright liability,
contributory, vicarious and other styles of secondary trademark
liability, 145 and various other complaints. 146 The defendant, Visa,
had made consumer electronic funds transfers at the direction of,
and pursuant to its issuer-contracts with its merchant customers.
These were transfers into the merchant accounts of the persons
who, it was alleged, had infringed Perfect 10's copyrights and
trademarks. The case turned on the merchant-card issuer side of
the consumer credit card payment system. The allegations
addressed the claims that Perfect 10 had notified the card issuer
that certain identified offending merchants were in the business of
totality of the circumstances, and as a matter of law, rise to the level of active encouragement of
infringement by home "librarying" and retention of time-shifted content. Otherwise the Court might
have remanded. On the other hand, and using the same standard, the Court concluded the state of
the record compelled the finding that the totality of the circumstances surrounding the conduct of
Grokster and the other defendants very likely did rise to the level of active encouragement of
infringement, and so it remanded, and so it was eventually found, see supranote 136 (observing the
result on remand: liability for inducing infringement).
141. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936-37. Compare Sony, 464 U.S. at 790-91 ("supplying the
equipment that makes [some authorized] copying feasible should not be stifled...") with Grokster,
545 U.S. at 932 (concluding that "where an article is 'good for nothing else' but infringement...
there is no injustice in presuming or imputing an intent to infringe... ").See also id.
at 935 (noting
that the "classic case of direct evidence of unlawful purpose occurs when one induces commission
of infringement by another, or 'entic[es] or persuad[es] another to infringe .... as by advertising.").
It may be that active "inducement" itself tips the scales of justice decisively.
142. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Service Assoc., 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007).
143. Other defendants included several affiliated banks and data processing services and
another credit card company (MasterCard International, Inc.). Id. at 792.
144. Id.at 793.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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operating web sites that infringed upon Perfect 10's intellectual
property and other rights, and that the credit card issuer and
affiliates in the payment system nevertheless continued to honor
customer-side funds transfer charges from the customers' accounts
ultimately to the merchants' accounts as processed for payment
through the intermediation of the credit card payment system.
The most interesting thing about the case, other than its
having been brought at all, or its having taken two Rule 12(b)(6)
motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim before being
disposed of in the defendants' favor, or its requiring a fairly
comprehensive majority opinion to affirm the result (dismissing
the case), was the fact that it attracted a carefully written, weighty
(or at least lengthy) and passionate dissenting opinion from an
accomplished judge who seriously urged that the credit card
company could have been liable (and so the complaint ought not
to have been dismissed) because of its part in the payment system
that ended up putting cash into the accounts of the wrongdoers.
Perfect 10 is an appellate decision and, as such, it not only
followed Sony and Grokster, but also heeded the binding
precedent from within the Ninth Circuit itself, including
Napster.148 The very fact that plaintiffs presented a plausible case,
at least as understood by one capable appellate judge, sends a
message of some sorts about the possibly lengthening shadow, or
penumbra of secondary liability post-Grokster.
C. Hostage-Style Policy-BasedSecondary Liability
It seems that the dissenting opinion in Perfect 10 might be
hard to distinguish from the sort of policy-based secondary
liability that characterizes some of the automobile cases (outside
of intellectual property). 149 Indeed, to the extent that it might lead
yet further, it seems not unfair to say it might be pointing the way
to a sort of hostage-style liability that, at least in the context of
new technological uses, might not be so apparent. That is, if
someone were to suggest that payment systems be used to regulate

147. Id. Conceivably, it might have been possible to allege secondary liability for alleged
customer-side offenders as well, on the assumption that not only the offending merchants but also
their customers might have been directly infringing. No doubt it was much easier to identify, and to
allege and prove direct liability of, the offending merchants than their customers.
148. A&M Records v. Napster, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
149. See supra notes 60 and 95.
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wrong-doing in ordinary space (instead
of in the code world),
50
someone might more readily object. 1
It is only a slight extension of the dissenting opinion in
Perfect 10 to make an electronic marketplace the guarantor of the
integrity of the marks used in connection with the goods sold by
others, and a compelled enforcer of the proprietor's trademarks.
The jewelry company, Tiffany, alleged that eBay was secondarily
liable for just such trademark infringement by multiple
counterfeiters,] 51 notwithstanding eBay had made a substantial
investment in anti-counterfeiting initiatives, investing "as much as
$20 million each year on tools to promote trust and safety on its
website" and that more than 200 eBay employees "focus
exclusively on combating infringement, at a significant cost to
eBay.', 152 In a meticulous opinion, the court reasoned that eBay
was not secondarily liable, engaging in a multi-step analysis: (1)
eBay did exercise sufficient control over its website that the
Inwood test for secondary liability in trademark law applied, (2)
under the Inwood test, the appropriate measure is whether eBay
knew or had reason to know of the infringement, (3) generalized
knowledge is insufficient to impute knowledge of "any and all
instances" of infringing activity, (4) letters to eBay from Tiffany
provided only generalized knowledge, (5) eBay was not willfully
blind to infringement, (6) when eBay had knowledge of specific
infringing listings, eBay promptly terminated them, (7) when eBay
had knowledge that a seller was repeatedly engaging in counterfeit
activity, eBay's "pattern" was to suspend the seller, and (8)
ultimately, the burden
of policing Tiffany's mark "appropriately
153
rests with Tiffany."'
In reaching its conclusion, the Tiffany case was following the
Inwood rule, and was not the first to address flea markets, 15' nor
was it the first to conclude that the determination "whether the
venue is online or is brick and mortar" is immaterial. 155 What is

150. Something like this may already be happening. See Section I.A.2(d) and (e).
151. Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d463 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
152. Id. at 476.
153. Id. at 518. See also supra note 49 (discussing Inwood in the context of inducement-style
secondary liability and for a kind of contributory-style secondary liability in trademark cases).
154. The Seventh Circuit had ruled on such a case. Hard Rock Caf6 Licensing Corp. v.
Concession Services, Inc., 955 F.2d 1143 (7th Cir. 1992), see supranote 77.
155. The Ninth Circuit had ruled on such a case. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions,
Inc. 194 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 1999).
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noteworthy about Tiffany was the remarkable scope of the effort
that the mark proprietor, Tiffany, expected of eBay.
II. CATEGORIES OF OLD AND NEW USES

New technological uses do not arrive without the context of
existing law. The existing law was not developed in anticipation of
new technological uses. Before simply translating or transposing
existing rules to NTUs, it would be well simply to notice and
recognize some of the odds and ends that have played at least
some part in determining current standards. In light of those
standards, it may be well to consider exactly what, if anything,
they can teach about secondary liability for NTUs in cases
involving: (1) trademarks where a resource provider/seller of
keyword triggered advertising used by another faces possible
secondary liability for triggers that incorporate trademarked
expressions, (2) copyrights where a library lender faces secondary
liability for making books available to a person who intends to
copy all of the books to prepare an index, and to provide
retrievable extracts of the text in cyberspace, (3) copyright or
trademark-related payments, product distribution or market
transactions where intermediaries dealing in encrypted or time
sensitive transactions, or in the distribution of goods face
secondary liability for offending conduct by users of the services.
These and other circumstances suggest that any too-easy
expansion of secondary liability rules might lead to a hostagestyle regime in which various entities are deputized (or dragooned)
to serve as law enforcement officers acting involuntarily on behalf
of proprietors of intellectual property without traditional notice or
opportunity for hearing to those who are said to be directly
infringing actors; without clear rights of recourse, reimbursement,
exoneration and subrogation on the part of those against whom
secondary liability is sought; and with an overly mechanical
application of the ordinary rules (one might think that the cable
company "contributes" to its customers' use of the cable, but one
might think that more would be required before thinking about
serious risks of secondary liability). It would seem an unprofitable
undertaking to wonder whether a cable company is more like a
landlord than like a dancehall proprietor. A brief listing of uses
will follow. The lists are not intended to do anything more than to
name some of the existing categories. The only inference to be
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drawn is that this is an eclectic list of existing categories, but
without obvious and evident direct and neutral application to the
NTUs in the code world. My point is that neutral principles will
not carry the day, but rather some principle of deliberate choice,
outside of the wooden recitation of "rules" or of existing patterns
will be needed.
A. Dram Shops, Newsstands, andAutomobile Law
The set of old uses have provided the law with an opportunity
to reasonably distinguish between and among the secondary
liability (or not) of the diverse crowd of dance hall proprietors
(often liable for their hired bands), landlords (generally not liable
for their tenants), department stores (sometimes liable for their
record departments), grocery stores (for their butcher's sections),
automobile owners (for their drivers), dram shops (for some
drunkards), hosts (for their company or their employers), firms
(for tipsy, groping or hostile workers and workplaces) gun shops
(for outlaws), newsstands, publishers and bookstores (for the
contents of their books or magazines), credit card issuers (for
either their consumer clients or their merchant clients), and
libraries (for the users of their unattended or non-conforming, coin
or card-operated photocopy machines).
When it comes to secondary liability, the two-part problem
under the general statement of the rule is to predict the extent of
direct liability-is someone liable?-and also to predict the extent
of secondary liability-if there is someone directly liable, is it
"just" to hold another person accountable? It sometimes seems
that only in hindsight do the various subcategories help to resolve
secondary liability problems of NTUs in the code world. It would
be better to have a set of purposely designed rules that can lead to
predictable results, prospectively.
B.

Trigger Words, Virtual Worlds, and Cypherspace

There is already a recognizable set of new uses in the code
world that provide the law with a reasonable opportunity to design
architecture of secondary liability rules. It is an open question
whether these will (or should) be merely applications of the same
"ordinary" rules to the NTUs as were tumbled onto, or carefully
designed for older uses, or whether the ordinary principles might
be intentionally adapted, transformed or otherwise redesigned. Just
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronintellectualproperty/vol3/iss1/3
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some of the representative new technological uses would include
(1) the new crowd of cyberspace resource providers (for their
advertisers or for other invited or uninvited, value-adding or free
riding, expected or unexpected, predators or guides engaged in
searching and retrieving, displaying and listing resources by way
of terms that incorporate trademarked expressions), (2) the
inventors, developers, distributors and financers of the new
machines that deliver users to the new technological places within
the code world-the metaverse, the virtual worlds, cypherspace
and cyberspace proper-for the conduct of their pirates, spoilers,
hackers, encrypted code makers and encryption code breakers, and
curious users, and (3) such "ordinary" intermediaries as payment
system participants, credit card, debit card, commercial electronic
funds transfer agents and other "enablers" (for their merchantcustomers, and perhaps for their consumer-customers). Many
others could be listed. In addition, those members of the general
public who use these resources constitute an interest that must be
considered.
C. "NeutralPrinciples" and Their Limitations
We might assume that neutral principles can (just barely) tell
the difference between and among the secondary liability potential
of the ordinary, existing dram shops and others, and that they can
handle yesterday's intellectual property cases. As a result of
Shapiro's landscape of expanded-for-copyright respondeat
superior type of secondary liability in copyright cases, 56a right
and ability of one "to supervise" another replaces the genuine
agency-based
requirements
of
a
master/servant
(or
employer/employee) relationship in which the other (the master)
has a right to direct the actor (the servant), with the full
master/servant level of control over the manner in which the actor
does its work. Moreover, "an obvious and direct financial interest"
by the other in the exploitation of the copyrighted materials by the
actor supplements the more basic agency law requirement that the
actor (the agent) must act "on behalf of' the other (the principal).
This, in turn, led to a rational basis for conceptualizing some
situations as "landlord-tenant cases" in which there is, generally,
no vicarious liability, and for distinguishing them from

156. Seesupraat 71.
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conceptualized "dance hall cases" in which there is vicarious
liability imposed upon another person for copyright infringement
by an actor.
The 'landlord-tenant cases' or 'straight lease' cases generally
result in no vicarious copyright infringement liability. 5 7 The
general result follows when an actual or conceptual landlord leases
to a tenant at a fixed rental and the tenant engages in copyright
infringing activities. If the landlord is without knowledge (thereby
avoiding contributory infringement and inducement-style
infringement), exercises no supervision, charges a fixed rental and
receives no other benefit from the actor's infringement nor
contributes to it, then the landlord is not liable. An opposite result
follows when the rental is pegged to the infringing activity, such
that the landlord now has an "obvious and direct" financial interest
in the infringing conduct of the actor and which, when coupled
with a right to control (as is contained in many if not all leases),
would lead to secondary liability under the expanded-forcopyright style of vicarious liability.
The 'dance hall' cases generally result in vicarious liability
for copyright infringement. 5 The actual or conceptual dance hall
proprietor is liable for the infringement of copyright resulting from
the unauthorized performance of a musical composition by a band
or orchestra whose activities provide the proprietor with a source
of customers and enhanced income. Going further than genuine
respondeat superior permits, the dance hall proprietor is liable
regardless whether the bandleader is considered, as a technical
matter, an employee or an independent contractor, and regardless
whether or not the proprietor has any knowledge of the
compositions to be played or has any control over their selection.
When transposed or translated into the code world and into
new technological uses, those same neutral principles seem
increasingly inapt (if not clueless) in distinguishing among any of
those same categories, much less able to distinguish pirates
(predators) from hitchhikers (surfers), hitchhikers' guides (value
added-resource providers) and ordinary users who are just passing
through or trying to do something useful or pleasant while there.'

157. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 438.
158. Seeid.
159. See Folsom, supra note 3 at 861.
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It may be time to abandon the search for neutral principles (at
least in private law having common law roots and where there is
no Constitutional law dimension) and to begin a serious search for
non-neutral (but fairly applied)principles of private law suitable
to rational imposition of secondary liability for new technological
uses. The desired non-neutral principles would be ones that can be
applied fairly because they would be predictable, practical and
clearly adapted to an articulated public policy (which policy
might, optimally, be designed to coincide with the common public
interest in NTUs in the code world). It is time to see what NTUs
can teach, and this Article uses the example of the code world to
show that a law purposely designed for NTUs is a law that might
serve as a model in ordinary space.
D. The Specter of SpectacularError
The specter of spectacular error comes from the twin
problem, which is exemplified in the most perplexing cases
involving secondary liability for new technological uses-these
are the cases in which it is not entirely clear what the direct
liability case consists in, compounded by the fact it is not entirely
clear whether (and if so why, exactly) it might be "just" to hold
someone else liable.
If that someone else happens to be the provider of the search
engine which enables, at least according to present business
models, the broad, open, accessible, navigable and generally
trustworthy use of the Internet (services provided by a person such
as, say, Google, Inc.), and if the secondary liability is
unconstrained, if it amounts to some sort of phantom or hostagestyle secondary liability imposed accidentally or at random rather
than pursuant to any conscious, deliberate and thoughtful policystyle of secondary liability, the results might be worse than the
ordinary run of the mill faults in the law. 160 Ordinary and
occasional faults, like certain other risks, can be designed around.
However, other juridical faults begin to approach systemic risk,
which cannot be accounted for or avoided. It is here that the
potential for catastrophic or spectacular error is manifest.

160. It might be just as spectacular an error to create legal-architectural barriers that will
impose burdens so high that only Google can bear the weight, and so to entrench Google as the sole
provider. See supra note 12.
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III. DESIGNING SECONDARY LIABILITY RULES FOR NTUs

A. Trigger Words, Indexes, and Search Engines
A first problem is invisible and attenuated conduct that
employs trademarked expressions as markers, triggers, magnets,
roadblocks or detours to function in ways not entirely like
"trademarks" in ordinary space. These new technological uses
raise problems in the first degree: do they create direct liability in
anyone? They also raise problems in the second degree: is there
someone else of whom it can be said it would be "just" to hold
them responsible for the conduct of another?
One solution to this problem is to design and employ an
explicit "nature and place of use" factor both generally applied,
and as specially developed for particular applications.' Another
solution is more carefully to apply existing principles in an
analytically tight manner: this would involve making an explicit
acknowledgement of the taxonomy of secondary liability
categories and subcategories, and then explicitly incorporating the
limits already existing in the general common law from which the
categories have been taken.16Another solution would be to focus
161. Folsom, supra note 3 at 825; Thomas C. Folsom, Missing the Mark in Cyberspace:
Misapplying Trademark Law to Invisible andAttenuated Uses, 33 RUTGERS COMP. & TECH. L.J.
137 (2007), and Thomas C. Folsom, Defining Cyberspace (FindingReal Virtue in the Place of
Virtual Reality), 9 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 75 (2007).
162. It is certainly a truism to note, as did Mr. Justice Holmes in Kalem, see supra note 18, that
secondary liability for copyright infringement is predicated "on principles recognized in every part
of the law" but this becomes a troublesome half-truth if not immediately qualified by the balancing
truism that such liability is limited, hedged and carefully circumscribed in every other part of the
law, see supra note 40. There can be no "careful" application of any principle of secondary liability
absent a healthy recognition of its limitations.
Moreover, merely pointing out that there are some principles of law "everywhere" does
not dispose of much other than the most obvious case, perhaps like Kalem itself. It is also necessary
to specify those principles and to keep them separate insofar as they are different, without which, as
in the case of the legendary (or apocryphal) trial judge who announced that he was prepared to
award the plaintiff a patent on its trademark, someone might set out to find a defendant vicariously
secondarily liable for contributorily inducing respondeat superior dance hall liability for policy
purposes. Starting with one legal category and ending up with several others while incidentally
mixing genus and species, all in the same sentence is -if not making a list or making a joke-a
recipe for bad law because it obscures the reason for the result and blurs both the factual and policy
implications. Having a carefully defined taxonomy of secondary liability rules, as outlined in
Section I.A. of this Article is a good starting point for more careful application of the existing
principles of secondary liability.
During the symposium discussions at which an earlier version of this Article was on the
table, I took the position that each of the various categories (at least each of the existing fault-based,
relationship-based, and consent-based categories) has a part to play, because each exists for an
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on non-neutral principles of secondary liability, as will be outlined
in section IV.
B.

Virtual Worlds, Virtual Money, and Funds Transfers

A characteristic of many places within the code world is free
association in consensual or contractarian-based places, which are
more or less open to abuse, control, or misuse. Contract law has
some limits in figuring direct liability and in secondary liability,
(there are problems in figuring who might be an intended
beneficiary, and in figuring rights of exoneration, subrogation and
restitution). Once money, virtual money and payment systems
enter the equation, and once other more or less remote providers
and enablers enter the scene, the problems become more urgent.
Far from being a harmless diversion of a mind given to puzzlesolving, high level encryption and decryption methods transmitted
in violation of copyright or other laws might result in
compromises to wire transfers, banking and other (sad to say)
almost routine identity theft. If there is direct liability, it is hard to
resist noticing that there is a plausible case for secondary liability
involving very substantial potential damages.
Exactly as said in section III.A., one solution is more
carefully to apply existing principles in an analytically tight
manner: this would involve making an explicit acknowledgement
of the taxonomy of secondary liability categories and
subcategories, and then explicitly incorporating the limits already
existing in the general common law from which the categories
have been taken.' 63 Another solution is to provide anti-code
breaking, and positive encouragement to designed architectures in
the code world that can provide something like a rule of law to the
metaverse, to virtual worlds, cypherspace and cyberspace proper

intelligible reason, and together they give reasonable content to the inquiry into the conditions under
which it is "just" to hold one person accountable for the offending conduct of another actor. On
further thought, it seems it would be worthwhile to reconsider the analytical and normative sense of
the various categories-perhaps some of them are unstable or unreliable. But that would have to
await another Article. In the meantime, it still seems fair to say not only that a more careful
application of the existing categories should be the goal of judges and fuir-minded litigants and
counselors, but also that there is an ultimate limitation in trying to resolve all of the problems in the
code world, cyberspace and new technological uses solely on the basis of "neutral" analysis of the
existing categories unguided by deliberate and explicit choices to favor some uses over others. See
infra note 172 (identifying problems with expansive secondary liability in cyberspace).
163. See supranote 162.
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while at the same time purposely designing secondary liability to
fit the new machines, requiring reasonable technological
accommodations to prevent misuse but not so burdening the new
machines as to make their developers hostages.
C. Cypherspace,New Machines, andAnti-Circumvention
Within certain other places in the code world a characteristic
problem is one of "measures and counter-measures" of encrypted
code-making, code-breaking, digital rights management, and anticircumvention. A creator of a new machine might want to design it
according to a particular architecture, but any limitations, ciphers
or machine-protection can usually be broken, hacked or
circumvented. 164 As already said, it might be fruitful to carefully
apply existing principles. Nevertheless, it might be necessary or
more suitable to find some way for the law to address direct
infringement, and secondary liability according to some designed
criteria to incentivize "qualified" new machines and to make it
more difficult to suppose that there is some right to defeat
designed safeguards.
IV. AFTERWARD: TOWARDS NON-NEUTRAL
PRINCIPLES IN PRIVATE LAW

A. Piratesand Guides, PreferringOne to the Other
The approach of this Article forthrightly advocates explicit
consideration of the "nature and place" of any new technological
use within the code world or cyberspace. Consequently, this
approach favors value-added mappers, guides, hitchhikers, and
ordinary users over pirates. Of course, "pirates" is a term that can
be defined in a rule-specific form and applied to predators,
spoilers and wasters. The expression is, in this specified sense,
more than just a conclusion in search of an argument,
65 but is a rule1
agents.
juridical
by
use
for
appropriate
based term,
164. Cf.generally STEVEN LEVY, CRYPTO How THE CODE REBELS BEAT THE GOVERNMENT-

SAVING PRIVACY IN THE DIGrrAL AGE (2001); HERBERT S. ZIM, CODES & SECRET WRITING
(authorized abridgment, 1948) (discussing techniques and problems, including serious public policy
issues, inherent in private code making and code breaking).
165. See supra note 14. The "pirate" in cyberspace is one who tampers with addresses or
magnets; plants deceptive address or magnets; or blocks or spoils addresses otherwise available in
cyberspace, thereby effectively denying access, making navigation difficult if not impossible,

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronintellectualproperty/vol3/iss1/3

50

Folsom: Toward Non-Neutral First Principles of Private Law
2009]

TOWARD NON-NEUTRAL FIRST PRINCIPLES OF PRIVATE LAW

B. Non-NeutralPrinciples,Neutrally Applied
New technological uses put pressure on the law in many
particular contexts. Within the several places of the code world,
this Article proposes a division of new technological uses,
including: (1) an objective cyberspace proper (implicating trigger
words, full-text copying to create an index to a library in space,
and search engines), (2) the metaverse (implicating virtual worlds,
virtual money, and funds transfers), and (3) an underlying technosphere of new machines or virtual machines (implicating codemaking, code-breaking, and anti-circumvention devices). There
are yet further places within the code world that can also be
divided for separate treatment.
This division of the code world will simplify, highlight and
clarify the real interests at stake and, therefore, will better illustrate
the problems. Solutions to secondary liability issues involving
NTUs in the code world may then be adapted to the different
problems implicated in each of the domains. These solutions are
not "neutral" principles but they are purposefully non-neutral
principles capable of neutral application in matters of private law,
according generally to common law doctrines already existing in
ordinary space but deliberately transformed for the "nature and
place of use" in the code world and cyberspace.
The principles are non-neutral because they are designed
purposely to choose among the different ways in which
cyberspace might be coded, and to select those that best support
the functional characteristics which make any particular domain
within cyberspace desirable to its users, and to sensible public
policy. Moreover, the principles are non-neutral because they seek
to distinguish pirates (predators) from valued adding resource
diverting information activity, taking advantage of the vulnerability of augmented presences, and
destroying trust. This sort of pirate bears little resemblance to the romantic, good at heart figures of
Captain Blood or Captain Reynolds. See RAFAEL SABATINI, CAPTAIN BLOOD: HIS ODYSSEY I

(Norman S. Berg 1977) (1922) (introducing the adventures of a medical doctor who finds himself
transformed into a gentleman pirate: "Peter Blood, bachelor of medicine and several other things
besides, smoked a pipe and tended the geraniums boxed on the sill of his window above Water Lane
in the town of Bridgewater"); SERENITY (Universal Pictures & Barry Mendel Productions 2005)
(recounting Captain Reynolds's good deed). And yet, even a "pirate" is not always engaged in his or
her occupation, and the flexible remedy of the new factor provides a way to make the policeman's
lot (and the judge's lot) a much more happy one, by fitting the remedy to the offense. Cf W.S.
GILBERT & ARTHUR SULLIVAN, PIRATES OF PENZANCE (1879) ("When a felon's not engaged in his

employment... or maturing his felonious little plans... his capacity for innocent enjoyment... is
just as great as any honest man's."). Folsom, supra note 3 at 889-90.
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providers (guides) and to discourage the one while encouraging
supporting the other. Likewise, the principles are non-neutral
sbecause they seek to distinguish cyberspace actors who engage in
spoilage and waste (spoilers) and to prevent the law from
confusing them with value-adding resource providers and ordinary
users.
Precisely because the principles themselves are non-neutral,
but have an architectural design to them, it will become possible to
be neutral in their application because it will become possible to
figure out what reasonable good the principles are striving to
accomplish and to fashion and to identify relevant and concrete
facts that can be isolated ex ante in planning, ex post in litigating,
and at any time that judicial review is provided. At the very least,
the odds of predictable and practical neutral applications of the
admittedly non-neutral rules should be increased. The point of
such a system is to fairly and neutrally determine who is (or is not)
a pirate, spoiler, or predator, and who is a value adding guide.
These determinations can be made by a neutral application of rules
that are not indifferent between pirates and spoilers on the one
hand, and guides, users, and the public interest on the other hand.
C. Interim Design Solutions: Safe Harborsand Limited
Remedies
In the short term, we can propose that courts would be well
within their permissible roles of developing copyright, fair use,
trademark and related law, including unfair competition, if they
explicitly designed secondary liability rules with the deliberate
purpose of discerning and then advancing the public interest in the
code world, cyberspace and NTUs. More specifically, the courts
would be well within their permissible roles of (1) applying
remedies, especially the injunctive remedy, in a flexible and
limited manner, and consistently (in the case of injunctive
remedies) with the ordinary principles of equity including the
public interest, and (2) figuring out and mapping what, exactly, are
the contours of the (extra-statutory) secondary liability rules that
should apply in copyright and trademark cases.
We might expect the affected industries, if not congress or
some state legislature, to start with practical safe harbor rules.
These could be announced, established and followed as practical
standards. In addition, courts might purposely design certain
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firewalls into their developing rules, extending or contracting
direct liability in cyberspace so as to shield value-adding resource
providers from the outset, rather than exposing them to litigation
risk of phantom or hostage-style secondary liability during the
sometimes surprisingly lengthy period of time between the
crystallization of somewhat new forms of direct liability in
cyberspace or the code world and the working out, by statute or
otherwise, of the consequences on all of those who might be
secondarily liable.
A concrete suggestion for safe harbor rules can be derived
from the consent-based secondary liability model developed in
suretyship law, 166 and in contrast to the specter of hostage-style
liability. r 7 Using the example of the Tiffany case, 168 in which a
trademark proprietor (Tiffany) sought the enforced help of an
auction market owner (eBay), a court might consider something
like the two competing models:
Model A. eBay might announce that it will consent to monitor
and provide some negotiated level of support to trademark
proprietors against counterfeiters if: (1) the proprietors will
reasonably consult with eBay and identify the problem, (2) will
discuss the range of technologically reasonable accommodations
that eBay might be able to undertake (and the price and other costs
associated with each), (3) would agree to pay eBay for its
enforcement services, (4) would agree, as part of the reasonable
technological accommodation, to provide notice and an
opportunity to be heard, not only to the alleged counterfeiters, but
to certain identified public interest law firms or other entities who
might determine to assist the alleged counterfeiters in
demonstrating some fair use, nominative use, descriptive use (or
some "non-use") defense, and (5) would otherwise agree to
exonerate, reimburse, and to provide subrogation rights to eBay
insofar as eBay is acting on behalf of Tiffany.
Model B. Tiffany might announce that (1) it hasn't the ability
to enforce its own mark in the code world, and that it doesn't have
any likelihood of initiating a criminal trademark proceeding (or
that there is insufficient evidence for criminal investigators to
obtain an effective search warrant), but that (2) there exists an

166. See suprasection I.A.2.c (discussing consent-based secondary liability in suretyship law).
167. See supra section LA.2.e (discussing hostage-style secondary liability).
168. See supra section l.C. & notes 151-155 (discussing Tiffany).
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almost inherent power within the code world itself to create a
highly regulated environment such that (3) eBay could or should
create an architecture by which eBay can more perfectly control
and more efficiently monitor and unilaterally prevent offending
conduct, and (4) upon penalty of hostage-style liability, eBay must
create and enforce the regulated environment entirely at its own
cost.
The two models are, perhaps, exaggerated. Even so, they help
to illustrate the point so compellingly made by Professor Lessig.
Model "A" tends towards a workable consent-based system of
secondary liability for new technological uses in cyberspace and
the code world. It could apply just as easily, with certain
adaptations, to trigger words, addresses, and targeted advertising
offenses involving trademarked expressions or involving other
spoiling and wasteful uses of markers in cyberspace, and it could
equally well apply to many other problems in the various other
places within the code world. In a similar manner, the distributor
of a new machine could offer to consult with intellectual property
rights proprietors or their trade associations, and could offer to
install reasonable technological accommodations, including
reasonable anti-circumvention measures that do not defeat
reasonable user access to the technology, and with the cost to be
shared by the proprietors of the intellectual property rights. Under
Model "A" the result of such an offer might be the tender of a
"qualified" new machine, or a "qualified" place within the code
world. A court faced with a complaint could, and should consider
developing a law of secondary liability for NTUs that is highly
sympathetic to qualified new machines and qualified places within
the code world.
A complementary version of Model A, initiated by an
intellectual property rights proprietor, can be easily outlined. It is,
essentially, the reciprocal of Model A. Under the complementary
version, a proprietor might approach a distributor, resource
provider or other target of potential secondary liability and offer
essentially the same set of terms (consultation, discussions
designed to find reasonable technological accommodations, shared
payment for the costs of enforcement services, provision of notice
and opportunity to be heard, and exoneration, reimbursement and

169. See LEsSIG, supra note I (observing that cyberspace can be highly regulated).
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subrogation). Model A and its complement permit either the target
or the proprietor to initiate the offer of a safe harbor to the other.
Model "B" on the other hand illustrates the effect of an
emerging de facto hostage-style system of secondary liability for
new technological uses in cyberspace and the code world. It also
isolates a class of "opportunistic plaintiffs" and distinguishes them
from those plaintiffs who might more plausibly or "justly" petition
for judicial assistance in enforcing their rights by way of
secondary liability. This is because the opportunistic plaintiffs
asserting the Model B position would embrace the class consisting
of those who have, in effect, declined the offer of Model A.
According to the hypothesis of Model B, the opportunistic plaintiff
would be the one who refuses to pay its share of the costs of
enforcement, but who (like Tiffany) would rather impose all the
"externalities" of enforcement upon a resource provider and,
indirectly, upon the ordinary users of the code world.
A complementary version of Model B can also be derived.
Just as Model B supposes a proprietor who seeks to impose the
entire costs of enforcement on the distributor, resource provider or
other target of potential secondary liability, so it is possible to
suppose the case of a target who refuses any accommodation at all.
This complementary version is not quite a reciprocal of Model B,
but it evidences the same refusal to "recode" the architecture.
Under the complementary version, the target would be the one
who refuses to consider how it might recode the architecture of its
place within the code world to assist the proprietor in enforcing
the proprietor's rights, refusing any technological accommodation,
insisting that the proprietor take care of itself, and refusing to
accept any share of responsibility to engage in reasonable
recoding.
The examples of Model A and Model B illustrate two
important effects of the "nature and place of use" in resolving
secondary liability in the code world. First, the tender of a Model
A sort of accommodation by either a proprietor or a target
provides a ready tool to assess the nature of the counter-party's
activity and motivation. The counter-party who refuses a Model A
tender is one who raises at least an inference (and perhaps a
presumption) that it is, (a) if a target, then also very likely a pirate
or spoiler (else why would it refuse a reasonable technological
accommodation that the proprietor is prepared to fund?) or (b) if a
proprietor, then very likely an opportunistic free-rider in the

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2009

55

Akron Intellectual Property Journal, Vol. 3 [2009], Iss. 1, Art. 3
AKRON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL

[3:43

secondary liability arena (else why would it refuse to discuss or to
share the costs of reasonable technological accommodations that a
target might propose to help the proprietor help itself?). In the
non-neutral design of legal rules of secondary liability, the tenderfollowed-by-refusal cases of Model A provide an efficient rule of
thumb for adjudication. Juridical agents are competent to
determine such facts as these, and to draw sensible inferences
from them. Second, the examples of opportunistic parties under
Model B provide a ready tool by which to de-couple and remix the
two parts of the general rule for secondary liability. Even if there
is someone liable for direct infringement, it does not follow, in the
case of an opportunistic proprietor/plaintiff of the Model B type
that it is "just" to hold someone else accountable. Conversely, in
the case of the complementary Model B, it may very well be "just"
to hold a target accountable for refusing to discuss or provide any
reasonable technological accommodations to the proprietor.
The importance of the Model A and Model B tenders of
reasonable technological accommodations (or the refusal of any
accommodation) is that they not only provide a ready rule of
thumb for evaluating the nature and place of the offending use in
the code world by creating a test that helps to self-identify the
parties as predatory, offensive, opportunistic or value-adding, but
that these tenders also avoid the trap of legal rules that would force
an architecture of yet higher control upon the code world than
these more modest tenders would do. The mere fact that the code
world "can" accommodate architecture of rather extraordinary
control is a fact that might create an almost irresistible pressure
woodenly to expand in the code world the rules of secondary
liability as those rules have developed in ordinary space.
This pressure could lead towards the trap of accidentally
imposed hostage-style secondary liability in the code world. This
is because the possible architectures of regulation in the code
world certainly "can" result in a mechanical expansion of
secondary liability. As to fault-based rules, 170 there almost
certainly is technology within the code world by which a resource
provider "can" have knowledge of infringing activity, and it would
follow that the provider, merely by providing the new machine or
place, is "materially contributing" to the offending activity.
Secondary liability would seem to follow, as an analytical matter,
170. See supra Section I.A.2.a. (describing the fault-based rules of secondary liability).
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but the result seems ill advised. As to relationship-based rules (at
least in the expanded-for-copyright style version),' 7 1 there almost
certainly is technology within the code world by which a resource
provider "can" exercise control or supervision, and there almost
certainly are metering devices which "can" allocate some direct
financial benefit to the provider that is attributable to the offending
conduct. Secondary liability would seem to follow, as an
analytical matter, but the result seems ill advised. Though
secondary liability might seem to follow in such cases, these
would seem to be mindless applications of existing rules precisely
to the extent that such applications might be unmindful of the
consequences.172 It is because of the consequences that interim
safe harbors can and should be part of the juridical toolbox in
constructing the architecture of secondary liability for NTUs.
A common denominator in fashioning safe harbors for new
machines and new technological uses in the code world is to
consider always the "nature and place" of the alleged offense in
both steps of the secondary liability inquiry: both in determining
whether there is someone who is directly liable, 173 and in deciding
whether it is "just" to hold some other person accountable. The
models proposed herein are illustrative of how to think about
doing so in a practical manner. No doubt, there is room for
refinement and for the development of yet other models, but the

171. See supra Section LA.2.b. (describing the relationship-based rules of secondary liability).
172. The consequences might be spelled out in greater detail but would include: (1) the
invasiveness of private enforcement of intellectual property rights by third party gatekeepers and
intermediaries who would necessarily be collecting vast quantities of data about a huge number of
customers and users, (2) the pervasiveness of something akin to private "take down" notices that (if
secondary liability should ever attach to credit card intermediaries, or debit card, or bank check
clearing systems) could deprive any number of persons of rather important things without much in
the way of notice and an opportunity to be heard (substituting private parties for "the state" or for
the "police" is not likely to make warrantless searches and process-less deprivations any less
bothersome), and (3) the forced labor by which some resource providers and intermediaries would
be put in the service of intellectual property proprietors (this would seem an oddly reversed sort of
"internalization of externalities" of intellectual property). There are other consequences that could
be spelled out, and these are without including the obvious direct consequence, which is the real
likelihood of distortion and degradation of the code world, contrary to the public interest in the
productivity, knowledge and enjoyment that it provides. At the very least, these consequences
should be thoughtfully explored and the law should be purposefully developed, and not simply
evolved through some sort of "neutral" applications to the code world of secondary liability
principles developed in ordinary space.
173. See supra note 161 (providing examples of the "nature and place of use" as applied to
some problems in cyberspace and the code world).
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models given herein can be a good starting point. This method can
preserve both the commons and common sense.
D. Long Term Design Solutions: DisintegratingIP
The short-term solution can involve safe harbors and
purposeful development of non-neutral rules based upon the nature
and place of use in cyberspace and the code world. The long-range
solution is to recognize that intellectual property is ripe for
disintegration. There is, and has been for a substantial period of
time, an intertwining of "liability" rules with the "property" rules
that characterize the mixed domain of copyright, trademark,
patents and cognate "intellectual property" disciplines. This
encroachment is one of the perplexing reasons why there is so
much fundamental incoherence (or at least the appearance of some
small sort of discomfort as 74widely reported and as anecdotally
observed in the disciplines). 1
If the law could disintegrate the two interests (property-style
rights to exclude, and liability-style incentives for intangible
products of the mind), we could then concentrate the fire-power,
injunctions and incentives of property-style rules on protecting
real patents on really non-obvious inventions of truly patentable
subject matter that are really claimed clearly and distinctly and
really infringed literally; for protecting real works of authorship
having real originality and a modicum of creativity, really
infringed in the copyrightable elements thereof by a reproduction
of an identical duplicate copy (or substantially so), or by
distribution of identical copies, or by an adaptation, or other clear
and "literal" act of infringement; and for trademarks or whatever
anyone wants to call the "non-property proprietary interest in
preventing a likelihood of confusion" in a designation, preserving
from a likelihood of confusion those marks that really are
distinctive, really are strong, and really are infringed.
For all the other non-property cognates, pretenders, nonsense
or ghost patents, phantom copyrights and invisible or attenuated

174. See Thomas C. Folsom, Truth in Intellectual PropertyRevisited: Embracing eBay at the
Edge, 2 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 69 (2008) (distinguishing, for example, plagiarism-type offenses
that ought to be treated to liability-style rules-requiring some measure of notice and attribution
without the right to exclude-masquerading as property-style rules which demand some sort of
injunctive relief, and sometimes substantial damages). The same applies in patent and in trademark.
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trademarks, 175 a set of flexible liability-style rules could provide
modest, efficient and sensible remedies that incentivize various
categories of useful (or high-sweat) activity without emptying the
public domain. As the disintegration project proceeds, the
problems of secondary liability for new technological uses are
likely to resolve themselves. To the extent the battleground over
the question whether anyone is liable for direct infringement in the
code world becomes calmer, and the remedies for non-property
offenses less onerous, and as the question whether it is "just" to
hold another accountable for such activity becomes less loaded
with the possibility of spectacular error, secondary liability
problems should fade in significance. The tools to disintegrate are
already in existence, at least for intellectual property as it relates to
new technological uses. All that needs to be done is to commence
on a course of rewriting the code, on purpose, to achieve the
desired results. It is, after all, only a matter of choice.
CONCLUSION

Secondary liability has developed by categories: (1) faultbased, (2) relationship-based, (3) consent-based, (4) policy-style,
and, perhaps, (5) hostage-style. Because the code world of
cyberspace, new machines and new technological uses permits a
very high degree of regulation and control, it creates a set of
relationships, consents, policy choices, and hostage-taking
opportunities much greater in degree than does "ordinary space."
As a result, the ordinary rules of secondary liability cannot
sensibly apply to the new technological uses absent a deliberate
choice of the architecture of control that "we" want. It may be the
case that there is no such thing as a law of cyberspace or of any
new technological use. Nevertheless, there certainly may be, and
should be a law developed purposefully for new technological
uses in cyberspace and the code world. While technologies (and
"places") have no intrinsic nature, the purpose for which they are
specified, designed and used permits us to derive a characteristic
good, or purpose, and to articulate a public interest in the code
world. Law, to the extent it is free to grow (and especially if it is
wide open to contrary and equally plausible interpretations),

175. Id. at 78-79.
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should be purposely cultivated so that it grows in a way designed
to foster the goods of the code world, cyberspace and NTUs.
Cyberspace and NTUs comprise a sort of early warning
device that is sensitive to otherwise latent problems elsewhere in
the substantive law, they constitute a modular and coded domain
that can be broken down and redesigned simply by rewriting the
code, and they are important both economically and practically.
For all these reasons, the law ought to be purposely designed
simultaneously to resolve both parts of the most generally stated
secondary liability equation: (1) is there someone who is directly
liable (and for what, exactly), and (2) if so, is there someone else
whom it is "just" to hold accountable? It certainly seems there can
be neither sense nor justice in holding value-added cyberspace
resource providers, intermediaries, or distributors of qualified new
machines to some sort of phantom or hostage-style secondary
liability, just because it accidentally happens that they find
themselves in the juridical cross-hairs developed in ordinary sace
and without much careful thought to new technological uses.
Instead, a new rule of thumb, the "nature and place of use"
coupled with flexible and limited remedies may resolve the
problem and create a principled, practical and predictable set of
rules. The desired principles themselves are non-neutral-they are
designed to discourage pirates, predators and spoilers, and to
encourage hitchhikers, guides, and the public interest in the code
world and cyberspace. Such non-neutral principles of private law
(and perhaps only such principles) actually will permit the fair and
neutral application of the law in a way that can confidently be
predicted to do some definable good.

176. It is no solution simply to declare "prizes, prizes!" and to task a resource provider,
intermediary, or distributorwith emptying its pockets to provide the prizes. See infra Appendix A.
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Appendix A: (Prizes! Prizes!)

SirJohn Tenniel, "Alice and the Dodo" 1865 (publicdomain) t
... The Dodo suddenly called out "The race is over!" and they
all crowded round it, panting and asking "But who has won?"
This question the Dodo could not answer without a great deal
of thought, and it stood for a long time with one finger pressed
upon its forehead (the position in which you usually see
Shakespeare, in the pictures of him), while the rest waited in
silence. At last, the Dodo said, "Everybody has won, and all must
have prizes."
"But who is to give the prizes?" quite a chorus of voices
asked.
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"Why, she, of course," said the Dodo, pointing to Alice with
one finger; and the whole party at once crowded round her; calling
out, in a confused way, "Prizes! Prizes!" Alice had no idea what to
do, and in despair, she put her hand in her pocket, and pulled out a
box of comfits... and handed them around as prizes. There was
exactly one a-piece, all round.
"But she must have a prize herself, you know," said the
Mouse.
"Of course," the Dodo replied very gravely. "What else have
you got in your pocket?" it went on, turning to Alice. "Only a
thimble," said Alice sadly. "Hand it over here," said the Dodo.
Then they all crowded round her once more, while the Dodo
solemnly presented
77 the thimble ... and, when it had finished...
they all cheered.'
For the substitution of Google, Inc. and the libraries that lend
books to it, or eBay, Visa or MasterCard (or anyone else
vulnerable to hostage-style liability) for Alice, and the undesirable
consequences of doing so see supra sections II and III, and note
172 supra. For an alternative solution to the problem of hostagestyle secondary liability in cyberspace that preserves the commons
(and common sense), see supra section IV.
f
Picture
Credit:
The
Victorian
Web
(http://www.victorianweb.org/art/ illustration/tenniel/alice) (last
visited 10/27/08)
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